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WHY SHOULDN’T I BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE MY 
PROPERTY TO WHOMEVER I CHOOSE AT MY 
DEATH? (OR HOW I LEARNED TO STOP 
WORRYING AND START LOVING THE FRENCH) 
Terry L. Turnipseed*
The act of constitution will be precisely that regularly required to create or transfer the 
right in question.  Thus, until late in the Empire, if the object handed over as dowry is 
res mancipi, a mancipatio or in jure cessio will be necessary, whereas for res nec 
mancipi a simple traditio will suffice.  The distinction has disappeared, as every one 
knows, by the time of Justinian, and traditio serves for anything corporeal.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
This abstract question has intrigued philosophers of all ages; and has 
likewise furnished a peg on which to hang many a pedantic decoration of legal 
erudition.2
Should you be able to leave your property to whomever you choose at 
death?3  That seemingly rhetorical question has been answered, off and on, 
                                                                                                                 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.  The author received a 
J.D. and an L.L.M. in Taxation at the Georgetown University Law Center, two Master of 
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research assistants, Lisa Bojko and Jennifer Maxwell, for their tireless assistance and wonderful 
smiles. 
1 PERCY E. CORBETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE 155 (Oxford Univ. Press 1969) (1930). 
2 LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 4 (1955).  
3 One survey found that 73 percent of Americans answered “yes” to the following question:  
“When a person makes a will, he should be allowed to leave his money or property to 
whomsoever he pleases.”  MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 207-09 
(1970).  Note that this Article does not deal with the issue of disinheriting your children, which 
one can do in all states, except Louisiana and in the District of Columbia.  See id. (discussing 
the right to disinherit a child). 
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with a consistent resounding no, for literally thousands of years.  Has society 
finally evolved to the point when we say no to the paternalistic interference 
that has been the norm; when we say yes – a person does have the simple but 
powerful right to devise his or her property as he or she sees fit?  After all, is 
this America or is this France?4
This Article analyzes whether the ancient common law concepts of dower 
and curtesy, and their modern day statutory equivalents – the elective share 
laws – should be substantially modified or eliminated.5
The concept of dower dates to ancient times.6  Originally, a widowed 
woman was given a life estate in one-third of certain of her husband’s real 
property – property in which the husband held an inheritable or devisable 
interest during the marriage.7  Once dower attached to a parcel of land at the 
inception of the marriage, the husband could not unilaterally terminate it by 
transferring the land.8  The right would spring to life upon the husband’s death 
unless the wife had also consented to the transfer by signing the deed, even if 
title were held in only the husband’s name.9
Curtesy provided a surviving husband with a life estate in all the wife’s 
qualifying real property, but only if children were born to the couple.10  
Qualifying real property was the same as with dower, as were the rules that 
related to when the right attached and when it could be terminated.11
 
 
4 Forced heirship, in general, is inherent in civil law countries such as France.  Ralph C. 
Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 84, 117 (1994).  
Louisiana is the only American state with a form of forced heirship.  Id. at 118.  Ironically, 
surviving spouses in France do not need the protection of the forced heirship system (nor are 
they afforded it) because of their community property laws.  Id. at 117 (citing MARY ANN 
GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 248 (1989)). 
5 “Although a lengthy paper discussing the reformation of an elective share statute may show 
promise at first only as a cure for insomnia, it actually is an intriguing account of human 
struggles over the status of marriage and women, the control of property, the machinations of 
legislatures, and the struggles to achieve justice and fairness.”  Kathleen M. O’Connor, Marital 
Property Reform in Massachusetts: A Choice for the New Millennium, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
261, 261 (1999).  Stay with me people. 
6 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 423 (7th ed. 2005). 
7 Id. at 422-23. 
8 Id. at 423.   
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
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Virtually all United States jurisdictions have abolished dower and curtesy 
in favor of the elective share.12  In the few jurisdictions that retain the 
doctrines, curtesy is identical to dower.  Moreover, in the few states that retain 
the concept of dower, the elective share is also available and usually results in 
a greater financial award for the surviving spouse.  Georgia is the only state 
that does not have dower/curtesy, a statutory elective share, or community 
property concepts.13
In modern America, forty-nine of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia severely limit freedom of testation vis-à-vis surviving spouses.14  
More than in any other area of wills and trusts, state laws differ over the exact 
details of their elective share doctrines.  For example, states vary widely in the 
amount to which the surviving spouse is entitled, the variables that determine 
the amount (length of marriage, family situation, surviving spouse’s net worth, 
etc.), and the property that is subject to the elective share.  Typically, the 
surviving spouse is allowed to elect one-third of the decedent-spouse’s 
property if the decedent had surviving issue or one-half if there are no 
surviving issue.  Most elective share laws apply the same regardless of the 
length of the marriage.15
In some states, a testator can easily avoid subjecting her assets to the 
elective share at death simply by placing assets into one or more types of 
trusts.16  Other more sophisticated elective share statutes bring back into the 
pool of assets from which the elective share is taken most inter vivos transfers, 
including those made to trusts.   
All elective share statutes, however, can be defeated by transferring assets 
to an offshore asset protection trust.17  Once the transferor-decedent has died, it 
 
 
12 Though the “forms of action we have buried . . . still rule us from their graves.”  Emerson 
G. Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REV. 157, 158 n.8 (1960) (quoting 
F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker 
eds., 1936) (1909)). 
13 Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing the Surviving Spouse’s Elective Share, 32 U. MIAMI L. 
CENTER EST. PLAN. § 904 (1998).  
14 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 245 (1989). 
15 See generally discussion infra Part III. 
16 See discussion infra Part VI.B.1.a. 
17 See discussion infra Part VI.B.2. 
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is in reality impossible for a United States court to force the transfer of such 
assets back into the hands of the surviving spouse.18
While there may or may not have been valid grounds for dower and 
elective share concepts when they were originally adopted by most U.S. states, 
we are long overdue for a total review of the entire system of forced 
dispositions to spouses.  In particular, we must reexamine whether they are 
necessary at all.  The primary purpose of this paper is to stimulate such 
discussions, with the hopeful result that state legislatures will at least address 
the issue of elective share repeal to give freedom of testamentary disposition to 
all citizens, not just to those very wealthy who can afford expensive counsel 
fees to configure assets in needless, wasteful and complex arrangements 
specifically designed to defeat the elective share.  As one noted commentator 
said with elegance:  
One easy answer to this academic inquiry is that repeal of existing elective 
share statutes isn’t likely to happen, so why dance with the angels (perhaps 
the angels of darkness at that) on the head of a pin?  One easy response is 
because that is what academics like to do.  Another more useful response is 
there are states currently debating whether and, if so, in what respect to 
change their elective share statutes.  Rather than being settled law or policy, 
this topic continues to beguile legislatures.  And that would appear to indicate 
that there are conflicting policies at work about which reasonable minds 
differ.19
It is high time for policymakers to learn the facts – not just the politically 
correct rhetoric – about the costs to society of the current spousal forced 
heirship regimes in this country and the benefits that could flow from their 
elimination.  At a minimum, legislators need to decide in a clearer way the 
goals for the statutes and design better, more targeted solutions than currently 
exist today.20  However, it “may well be that there are too many solutions to a 
problem that does not really exist.”21
 
 
18 Thomas M. Brinker, Jr. & Thomas P. Langdon, The Offshore Trust: An Asset Protection 
Tool, OHIO CPA J., Apr. June 2000, available at http://www.ohioscpa.com/publications/ 
journal/default.asp?article=639-7. 
19 Pennell, supra note 13, § 905.   
20 One commentator defines the problem as “the inability of legislators to decide definitively 
what is the purpose of the elective share and to carry this purpose through to its logical ends.”  
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 426.  
21 Verner F. Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: The Surviving 
Spouse, Years Support and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REV. 447, 470 (1975-1976).  
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II. HISTORY OF DOWER, CURTESY, AND THE ELECTIVE SHARE 
A. Dower and Curtesy Generally 
In approaching the history of compulsory shares accorded by the common 
law to a decedent’s widow . . . one finds that the tale is discontinuous, the 
moral correspondingly recondite.22
For a long time in this country, and still in many separate property states23 
today, a widow had a dower interest in the lands of her deceased husband that 
were inheritable by the husband and wife’s issue.24  Widows received a life 
estate – not outright ownership – in one-third of her deceased husband’s 
qualifying land.25   
Unlike modern elective share rights, common law dower attached at the 
later of the moment of marriage or acquisition of the qualifying land.26  This 
aspect of dower is much more similar to the modern system of community 
property, where rights attach before death.  Because of this inter vivos 
attachment of rights (albeit a right to a future interest), land subject to dower 
was not alienable at the sole discretion of the husband-owner.27  Indeed, in 
jurisdictions where common law dower and a statutory elective share exist 
together, one of dower’s only real practical applications is to force the owner-
spouse of real property to obtain, in certain situations, the signature of the 
nonowner-spouse to sell or encumber the land.28  Widows of insolvent 
decedents, in addition, received dower before debts were paid (unlike 
 
 
22 Edmond N. Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1936-1937).  
23 A separate property jurisdiction does not follow the rules of a community property state 
that “recognizes the mutuality of marital relationships.”  ROGER W. ANDERSEN & IRA M. BLOOM, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES 246 (2d. ed. 2002).  Community property is property 
held jointly between husband and wife, including: “property acquired through the efforts of 
either spouse during the marriage and while domiciled in a community property jurisdiction, 
and income or proceeds from the sale of community property.”  Id.  “Separate property in a 
community property state [is] property that a spouse owned before marriage or acquired during 
marriage by inheritance or by gift from a third party . . . . ”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1369 
(7th ed. 2001).  Husband and wife each hold one-half ownership in the community property and 
one hundred percent ownership in their separate property.  ANDERSEN & BLOOM, supra, at 246.  
“At death, both spouses usually have the power to dispose of their own separate property and 
half of the community property.”  Id.   
24 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 422-23. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 423.  
27 See id.  
28 See id.  
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bequests, which could be claimed by creditors).29  Dower made women 
“necessary players in men’s economic transactions.”30
Curtesy was the widower equivalent of dower, with a couple key 
differences: (1) the widower was given a life estate in the entire land holdings 
of the decedent wife (instead of one-third as in the case of dower); and (2) 
nothing flowed to the widower unless the marriage bore children.31  In all 
states that retain the concepts of dower and curtesy, the rights embraced by 
both are identical, and in some jurisdictions, curtesy has been abolished and 
dower rights are afforded to widows and widowers equally.32
B. Ancient History of Dower and Curtesy 
Limitations upon free testation are at least as old as the Code of 
Hammurabi33 [circa 2084 B.C].34   
 
 
29 MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 143 (1986). 
30 Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of 
the Family and the State, 12 YALE L.J. 1641, 1666 (2003).   
31 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423. 
32Id.  In Michigan, dower-type rights are given to the wife but not the husband.  Id.  
Commentators note that this difference is likely unconstitutional.  Id. 
33 Cahn, supra note 22, at 139 (quoting R. HARPER, THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §§ 168-172 
(1904)); see also Rick Geddes & Paul J. Zak, The Rule of One-Third, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 
123 Table 1 (2002) (describing women’s property rights at marital dissolution from the Code   
of Hammurabi to 1977).  Geddes and Zak detail the very first known dower-type code language 
from the original Code of Hammurabi: 
In the case of either a private soldier of a commissary, who was carried off while in 
the armed service of the king, if his son is able to look after the feudal obligations, the 
field and orchard shall be given to him and he shall look after the feudal obligations 
of his father.   
If his son is so young that he is not able to look after the feudal obligations of his 
father, field and orchard shall be given to his mother in order that his 
mother may rear him. 
If a man should decide to divorce a sugitu who bore him children, or a naditu who 
provided him with children, they shall return to that woman her dowry and they shall 
give her one half of (her husband’s) field, orchard, and property, and she shall raise 
her children; after she has raised her children, they shall give her a share comparable 
in value to that of one heir from whatever properties are given to her sons, and a 
husband of her choice may marry her. 
Id. at 134-35.  Sugitu is defined as a “member of a group or class of temple dedicatees, with 
special privileges, but always inferior to a naditu.”  Id. at 137 n.48 (quoting MARTHA T. ROTH, 
LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR 18, 273 (1995)).  Naditu is defined as 
a “member of a group or class of Old Babylonian temple dedicatees, with special inheritance 
privileges and economic freedoms; some groups lived in cloisters or compounds, others married 
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During the early times in England when land holdings virtually equaled 
wealth, the land passed to blood relatives and not to surviving spouses – 
“[n]either husband nor wife was an heir of the other . . . .”35  Widows and 
widowers of decedent landholders were not left penniless, however, as dower 
and curtesy provided some support for their lifetime.36  These income rights in 
land “developed in medieval times to compensate women for loss of control 
over their real property during marriage and, especially, to make provision for 
widows after their husbands’ property had passed to the legal heirs.”37
Dower was originally a private contractual matter between the families of 
the groom and bride.38  Thirteenth-century common law recognized and 
enforced an early version of dower.39  The dower one-third fixed interest in the 
decedent husband’s lands40 likely came about during the early fifteenth 
century.41  (This rather arbitrary one-third interest was, oddly, carried all the  
way to the dower and curtesy laws of early America, and is inherent in 
many elective share laws today.42)  The widow lost her dower interest, 
however, if the husband-decedent had been guilty of treason or if the widow 
herself had been guilty of any felony, adultery, or treason.43
Much like community property today, the wife was granted a property 
interest in any real property received by the husband during marriage, even 
though her husband had legal title to the land.44  The husband could not defeat 
 
but were not permitted to bear children; Sumerian lukur.”  Id. at 137 n.49 (quoting ROTH, supra, 
at 273).  Lukur is a Sumerian term meaning priestess or nun.  WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
at http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/Nu/Nun.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2006). 
34 CORBETT, supra note 1, at 147 n.1.  
35 Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse’s Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 
U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 698 (1966) (citing 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 
176 (1950)). 
36 See id. 
37 LEE HOLCOMBE, WIVES & PROPERTY: REFORM OF THE MARRIED WOMEN’S PROPERTY LAW IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 21 (1983). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Speculation exists that early dower may have been the origin of the husband’s promise 
during a traditional marriage service: “With all my worldly goods I thee endow.”  Id. 
41 Brashier, supra note 4, at 89 n.18 (citing 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 190 (5th ed. 1942)). 
42 Id.  
43 HOLCOMBE, supra note 37, at 22. 
44 Brashier, supra note 4, at 90 n.20.  Brashier states: 
The wife’s expectant or contingent interest in the lands of which her husband was 
seised in fee simple and fee tail at any time during the marriage was known as dower 
inchoate.  If the dower right had not been barred and the contingency of survival had 
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her dower right without her consent,45 though if his wife agreed, he could bar 
dower by levying a fine when he conveyed his land to a third party without 
restrictions.46  The Statute of Uses of 1535 gave a married couple the right to 
enter into an antenuptial agreement whereby the wife would give up her right 
to dower in exchange for a jointure – a “settlement of land upon her at least for 
her own lifetime.”47
Because of the two distinct types of court systems that existed during this 
era – law courts and ecclesiastical courts48 – the manner used to determine the 
recipient of the tangible personal property varied widely.  The widow’s 
intestate share of tangible personal property was set by the 1670 Statute of 
Distribution49 as one-third if the decedent husband left descendants and one-
half if there were no descendants.50   
However, chattels were never subject to dower.51  Once married, in fact, a 
wife’s tangible personal property became the property of her husband.52  If the 
husband predeceased his wife, however, the widow’s tangible personal 
property that was hers before her marriage was “kindly” returned to her, but 
only if the decedent husband had not alienated the items before death.53   
Dower was necessary during this time because the wife’s property was 
essentially taken away at the time of marriage, and any property acquired by 
the marital unit after marriage was always placed in the name of the husband.  
“The extreme subordination of the wife at common law required that some 
form of protection from disinheritance be given to her upon the death of her 
 
been fulfilled, her inchoate right became dower consummate upon her husband’s 
death.  Until her dower was actually assigned, however, she had no right to enter 
upon the lands except under her right of quarantine.   
Id. (citing GEORGE L. HASKINS, ESTATES ARISING FROM THE MARRIAGE  RELATIONSHIP AND THEIR 
CHARACTERISTICS §§ 5.31-5.49 (A. James Casner ed., 1952)).  See also Statute of Uses of 1535, 
27 Hen. 8, ch. 10 (Eng.) (repealed).  
45 Brashier, supra note 4, at 91.  “Neither the testator’s will nor his inter vivos transactions 
could unilaterally defeat the dower right once the required elements were met.”  Id.   
46 HOLCOMBE, supra note 37, at 22. 
47 Id. 
48 Plager, supra note 35, at 698 (citing 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 625 
(1922); Thomas E. Atkinson, Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction, 8 MO. L. REV. 
107 (1943)). 
49 Id. (citing Statute of Distribution of 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 10 (Eng.)). 
50 Id. (citing THEODORE F. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 726 (5th 
ed. 1956)). 
51 Geddes & Zak, supra note 33, at 124. 
52 Brashier, supra note 4, at 89 n.19 (citing George L. Haskins, The Estate by the Marital 
Right, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 345, 345 n.1, 349 (1949)). 
53 Id. (citing Haskins, supra note 52, at 345 n.1). 
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husband, for often she was deemed unable or unqualified to venture from the 
home into a world run almost exclusively by men.”54  As Blackstone 
summarized: “The husband and wife are one, and the husband is that one.”55
Early English lawyers referred to the husband’s life estate as “a tenant ‘by 
the curtesy of England,’ to emphasize the liberality of the law as opposed to its 
Norman counterpart.”56  Curtesy operated a little differently than dower under 
English common law: 
Upon entering into a legally cognizable marriage, the husband acquired a 
marital tenancy in his wife’s inheritable freehold estates known as [j]ure 
uxoris [“by right of the wife”] for the joint lives of the couple.  He acquired 
his curtesy interest only upon the birth of issue capable of inheriting, at which 
time his interest was converted into an estate for his life known as curtesy 
initiate.  Upon the wife’s death, the husband’s life estate was known as 
curtesy consummate.  Because curtesy was limited to a life estate in the 
wife’s interests of which she was seised in possession at the time of her 
death, the husband could not enjoy curtesy as to reversionary or remainder 
interests she owned at the time of her death.57
While men received a one hundred percent interest in the wife’s lands, as 
opposed to the wife’s one-third interest in the husband’s lands, the husband 
was required to have issue that could inherit to obtain the curtesy interest.58  
No such requirement was present for a surviving wife to receive dower.59  As 
noted by commentators, this prerequisite of a male heir may help to explain 
“the eagerness with which the first heir was awaited, even by men with few of 
the normal fatherly characteristics.”60
 
 
54 Id. at 90-91. 
55 Marsha Garrison, Toward a Contractarian Account of Family Governance, 1998 UTAH L. 
REV. 241, 245 (1998). 
56 Brashier, supra note 4, at 91 n.27 (quoting Haskins, supra note 52, at 230). 
57 Id. at 90 n.20 (citing 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 210, at 15-93 
(Patrick J. Rohan rev. ed., 1993)). 
58 Id. at 91-92.  There were several elements of the issue requirement of old common law 
curtesy.  Id.  First, the mother and child must have survived childbirth.  Id.  Second, the husband 
might not receive curtesy if the marriage only bore daughters.  Id.  Finally, if the real property 
had been conveyed to the wife “in special tail” during a former marriage, the current husband 
would have no curtesy interest.  Id. at 92 n.28 (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 126-28 (1765-1769)). 
59 Brashier, supra note 4, at 92.   
60 Id. at 92 n.29 (citing JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY 90 (3d ed. 1989)). 
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The wide grant of the right of curtesy dates at least to the end of the 
twelfth century.61  This early right “was enlarged over the course of the 
thirteenth century.”62  After 1833, dower and curtesy were abolished in 
England.63  For 105 years thereafter, there was complete testamentary freedom 
in England.64  Between 1938 and 1975, an English statute provided that a court 
could in its discretion award maintenance to a surviving spouse and other 
specified descendants where the testator deprived them of a “reasonable share” 
of the property.65  From 1975 and on, the surviving spouse’s claim was not 
limited to maintenance, but instead a court had the same discretion afforded in 
a divorce situation to award “reasonable financial provision” taking into 
account all circumstances including conduct of the parties.66
C. History of Dower and Curtesy in America 
Borrowed from England, these estates represent the earliest form of 
protection from spousal disinheritance established in the United States.67
Like much of early American property law, dower and curtesy were 
imported from England,68 though today the difference between the laws in 
England and America are dramatic.69  Early on, dower and curtesy rights 
varied quite a bit between the colonies and later between the states.70  Early 
dower and curtesy statutes also varied from their English roots.71
 
In jolly old England when land was the major source of wealth for most 
well-off families, the dower system actually worked well in terms of adequacy 
 
 
61 Id. at 92 n.27 (citing Haskins, supra note 52, at 228). 
62 Id. (citing Haskins, supra note 52, at 228-29). 
63 GLENDON, supra note 14, at 241.   
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 241-42. 
67 Brashier, supra note 4, at 90. 
68 See Geddes & Zak, supra note 33, at 122 (“This right was considered so important that it 
was included in the Magna Carta by King Henry III . . . .”). 
69 GLENDON, supra note 14, at 244. 
70 Brashier, supra note 4, at 90 n.21 (citing MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 141-84 (1986); Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property 
Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1393-95 (1983)). 
71 Id. at 92 n.30 (citing Haskins, supra note 52, at 197).  For example, the old English curtesy 
requirements of actual seisin and birth of issue were not present in most American versions.  See 
generally id. 
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of support.72  Nevertheless, in the modern era of intangible wealth, dower 
makes very little sense and often results in little or no support at all.73  Because 
of this, dower (and curtesy) has been abolished in a large majority of separate 
property jurisdictions.74  Dower survives in four states alongside elective share 
statutes: Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio;75 though there are 
substantial differences between modern-day dower and traditional English 
dower.76  In Michigan and Ohio, a surviving spouse must choose either dower 
or an elective share.77  As discussed, elective share laws usually yield more 
assets, with the result that dower in this country is effectively moot.78
III. DESCRIPTION OF ELECTIVE SHARE STATUTES 
Caution.  There is no subject in this book on which there is more statutory 
variation than the surviving spouse’s elective share.79
Unfortunately for the goal of simplicity, the elective share statutes vary 
widely,80 and have been described as: 
[A] jungle, with hardly two states to be found that are exactly alike, and there 
exists in reality fifty different schemes most of which, when analyzed, are not 
built upon a single, adequate interest given the surviving spouse; but instead 
 
 
72 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423.  Of course, the widows did not own any of the 
land in fee simple. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  Dower inchoate, i.e., the vested expectation of a dower interest during the life of both 
husband and wife, acted as a restraint on alienability of real property.  Brashier, supra note 4, at 
93 n.32.  This was another reason for its decline in America.  Id.   
75 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423. 
76 See Brashier, supra note 4, at 93 n.35 (providing a full discussion of the differences).  
77 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423. 
78 Id.  One could imagine that in unusual situations, dower could yield the surviving spouse 
better financial results.  The two most prevalent benefits of dower over an elective share law 
are: (1) the inchoate rights inherent in dower that may lessen the ability of the spouse to transfer 
real property inter vivos, and (2) dower is given priority over creditors, which may protect the 
surviving spouse if the estate is insolvent. 
79 Id. at 425.  For an overview of the variations, Dukeminier references JEFFREY A. 
SCHOENBLUM, 2004 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING Tables 6.1-6.125 (2004).  Id. at 
425-26. 
80 The history of the development of the myriad elective share laws in America is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  As one scholar noted, “It would require a volume of some size, and more 
research than the subject is worth, to recount all the developments of the rules permitting a 
surviving spouse to elect against the will of the deceased spouse.”  SIMES, supra note 2, at 16. 
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give her a bit of homestead, a bit of widow’s allowance, and in addition a bit 
of dower or some statutory substitute therefore.81
Every separate property jurisdiction except Georgia gives a surviving 
spouse an elective share or forced share of the decedent-spouse’s property.82  
The elective share is just that – an election: the surviving spouse has the right 
to take the property, if any, left to him or her under the will or elect against the 
will and take the amount specified by the elective share law instead.83   
A. Traditional Probate-Only Statutes 
Simply put, the conventional forced share is highly arbitrary and may in 
some instances work more harm than good.84
Starting in the 1930s, state-by-state transitions from dower to elective 
share laws took place over several decades.85  New York state enacted the first 
elective share statute in this country.86  Legislators did so, it appears, based 
solely on anecdotal evidence of two instances of disinheritance; no 
disinheritance studies had been conducted at that time.87   
Some states retain what was originally the norm in this country – an 
elective share statute that gives the surviving spouse a share (usually one-third 
to one-half) of the property in the decedent-spouse’s probate estate only.88  
Planning around a probate-only type of law became so easy, and non-probate 
transfers such as life insurance, joint tenancies, qualified retirement plans, joint 
accounts and the like became so common, that most states now have 
toughened their laws to include, to some extent or another, nonprobate assets.  
However, probate-only elective share laws are still with us even today.   
 
 
81 WILLIAM J. BOWE ET AL., PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 3.13 (2003). 
82 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 425. 
83 Id.  Note that, as discussed below, in some states the election is to take the elective share or 
the property left to the surviving spouse by all sources, whether via the will or outside the will 
(e.g., life insurance proceeds, qualified retirement plans, joint property, etc.).  See, e.g., UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-204 to 2-207 (amended 1993). 
84 Brashier, supra note 4, at 102. 
85 Id. at 99 n.51. 
86 Id.  Brashier also points to In re Estate of Riefberg, for a chronology of how the New York 
state legislature went about enacting the first elective share law.  Id. (citing In re Estate of 
Riefberg, 446 N.E.2d 424, 427 (N.Y. 1983)). 
87 See Plager, supra note 35, at 685-86 (explaining that no empirical data supported the 
findings “as to the frequency, and thus the social significance, of disinheritance”). 
88 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 438 (emphasis added). 
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The probate-estate-only elective share laws have the advantage of 
simplicity.  As one commentator noted:   
The probate court need only know the total value of the estate to which the 
forced share applies and the applicable proportion of the estate (as set out in 
the statute) to which the surviving spouse is entitled.  There is usually no 
occasion for the taking of testimony about family relationships and history, 
and no need for the application of judicial discretion.89
Simplicity, however, has its disadvantages: “its total insensitivity to the 
surviving spouse’s actual need, the contribution the survivor may have made to 
the estate, and the reason why the testator, who presumably knew his family 
situation as well as anyone, preferred his particular dispository plan.”90  The 
probate-only type of elective share laws have been subject to stiff criticism.91
B. Modern Trend: Augmented Share 
The forced share system, as it currently exists in most states, is difficult to 
justify.  Recent societal changes have undermined whatever usefulness the 
system might have had.92
As previously noted, New York State was the first state to make a 
statutory attempt to deal with the issue of nonprobate transfers subject to the 
elective share.93  This larger pie is, in most state statutes, called the augmented 
share or augmented estate.  This augmented share provides the asset pool that 
the surviving spouse’s percentage is taken from.   
Other states soon followed New York’s lead, and today most separate 
property jurisdictions have some version of an augmented share concept.  
Because of the extreme variation from state to state, a survey of exactly what 
types of property are included in the augmented share is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  However, suffice it to say, most of these augmented estate laws 
still have loopholes that good (read “expensive”) planners can take advantage 
of if a client has a need to plan around the elective share. 
 
 
89 Plager, supra note 35, at 682. 
90 Id. 
91 See, e.g., Brashier, supra note 4, at 102; see also Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 
(Mass. 1984) (reaching beyond probate estate to include assets held in inter vivos trust). 
92 J. Thomas Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse’s Forced Share be Retained?, 38 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV 223, 224-25 (1987-1988). 
93 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 446; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW ch. 
952 (Consol. 1966), amended by N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney 
2005). 
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C. Uniform Probate Code Provisions 
If the goal is a partnership theory of marriage . . . it must be recognized 
that while the revised UPC is certainly better than the pre-1990 UPC and a 
step in the right direction, it is not a very large step.94
The Uniform Probate Code incorporates the most inclusive and detailed 
augmented share concept, leaving very few (but still important) loopholes.95  
The goal of the UPC drafters was to approximate as best as possible the 
division of property at death in a community property jurisdiction.96  Important 
differences remain, however.  One key difference is that the UPC augmented 
share includes all the property (including property acquired by gift and 
inheritance and pre-marriage property) owned by both spouses.97  In contrast, 
community property does not include property owned by the spouses before 
marriage or property acquired by gift or inheritance.98  This can act to increase 
quite dramatically (and quite unfairly) the share of the surviving spouse if the 
decedent spouse, for example, had a great deal of inherited wealth.  If, in 
addition, the surviving spouse is wealthy in her own right, then she may not 
receive any share of the marital property. 
For various reasons, the most recent version of the UPC elective share 
provisions has been adopted in only eight states.99
 
 
94 Charles H. Whitebread, The Uniform Probate Code’s Nod to the Partnership Theory of 
Marriage: The 1990 Elective Share Revisions, 11 PROB. L.J. 125, 139 (1992). 
95 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to 2-207 (amended 1993); see also discussion supra notes 
84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the loopholes in both UPC and non-UPC elective 
share laws). 
96 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 449. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  Note, however, that a couple may agree to characterize premarital property, gifts and 
inheritances as community property.  Id. at 456.  
99 Id. at 449.  These states, as Dukeminier points out, are mainly in the Great Plains.  Id. at 
450.  See JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2004 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING Table 
6.03 (2004). 
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IV. TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM 
America is uniquely the land of testamentary freedom.100  (But, only in 
Georgia!) 
Elective share laws interfere with an individual’s right to pass her property 
to whomever she wishes.  Freedom of asset disposition should be one of the 
most fundamental rights guaranteed by U.S. law.  Elective share statute 
decisions should be based on a balancing between the need to protect surviving 
spouses, which has decreased dramatically in modern times, and a testator’s 
fundamental right to freedom of testation.   
Despite not being constitutionally protected,101 the right of testamentary 
freedom has “gained general acceptance in Anglo-American law during the 
past two centuries.”102  For all its virtues, however, “[f]reedom of testation, 
once a hallmark of the common law, shares the contemporary fate of other 
more important liberties – it is in a state of decline.”103
In ancient Rome, testamentary freedom was the law.104  In the fifth century 
B.C., the law of the Twelve Tables was clear: “As he bequeathed shall be the 
law.”105  Philosophers in Roman times were very much in favor of freedom of 
 
 
100 Brashier, supra note 4, at 85 n.6 (quoting John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, 
Redesigning the Spouse’s Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 304 (1987)); see 
also Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights: California Breaks New Ground 
in the Fight Against Elder Abuse But Fails to Build an Effective Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 
537, 554 (2001) (“Testamentary freedom . . . comports with American ideals.” (citing Adam J. 
Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 12-13 
(1992), in JOEL C. DOBRIS & STEWART E. STERK, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 12-13 (1998))). 
101 Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and 
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 333 n.46 
(1978) (“The federal Constitution does not forbid a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the 
power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.” (citing Irving Trust Co. 
v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942))). 
102 Id. at 333 (citing THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 5 (2d ed. 
1953); 1 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF WEALTH 415-20 (1914); W.H. PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 1.7, at 27-28 (Bowe 
Parker rev. ed., 1960); E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, The Anthropology and Inheritance, in SOCIAL 
MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS NO. 1, INHERITANCE OF PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION 5-26 (Edmond N. Cahn ed., 1948)). 
103 Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom – A Report on Decedents’ 
Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 277, 277 (1955). 
104 Arthur Nussbaum, Liberty of Testation, 23 A.B.A. J. 183, 183 (1937). 
105 Id. 
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testation.106  Grotius, for instance, “found in freedom of testation an expression 
of natural law, only to be restricted by provisions for necessary support of 
relatives,” while Leibnitz “based the testamentary power on the immortality of 
the soul.”107
Wills as a concept date back to the “earliest period of reliably recorded 
Roman history.”108  In Rome, “no honorable citizen die[d] without having 
made his will.”109  Given the proper form, testamentary freedom at this time 
was virtually absolute.110
Testamentary freedom was an important part of the societal development 
of ancient Greece, Rome, and pre-1066 Anglo-Saxon England, especially 
when no issue were born to the testator.111  Indeed “‘[e]vidence of complete or 
almost complete substantive freedom of testation can be found only twice in 
history, viz., in Republican Rome and in England’” (during the one hundred or 
so year period anyway).112
Common law countries have traditionally incorporated the concept of 
testamentary freedom to a much greater extent than civil law countries.113  
Beginning with the Statute of Wills of 1540, England expanded testamentary 
freedom, though the Wills Act of 1837 finally eliminated the last remnants of 
the pre-1540 regime, namely limitations on dispositions of certain land 
tenures.114   
At the start of the twentieth century, New Zealand became the first 
common-law jurisdiction to pass legislation providing for certain family 
 
 
106 SIMES, supra note 2, at 4. 
107 Id. 
108 Katherine S. Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable 
“Revolution”, 50 LA. L. REV. 409, 485 (1990) (citing M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 
399 (1927)). 
109 Id. (quoting J. BRISSAUD, 3 HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW § 455, at 621 (1912)).  
110 Id. (citing L. OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 141, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE (1973)). 
111 SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 7-8. 
112 SIMES, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 137 (Max 
Rheinstein ed., 1954)). 
113 Brashier, supra note 4, at 121.  
114 Id. at 121 n.124 (citing Joseph Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England, 
25 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 344 n.42 (1940)).  Simes gives a slightly different summary of the law, 
stating, “until 1938, there was no restraint on testation in favor of the family in English law 
subsequent to 1724 as to personalty, and subsequent to 1822 as to realty.”  SIMES, supra note 2, 
at 10 (citing Dainow, supra).  No matter, the important point is that there was a substantial 
period in English law when there were no restrictions on testation. 
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members in the case of disinheritance.115  While this system did not 
incorporate the notions of forced heirship and allowed the testator to dispose of 
his or her property as desired, if the decedent spouse died without leaving 
proper support for the surviving spouse or children, a court could order such 
support at its discretion.116  Years later, England followed suit, enacting similar 
legislation and swinging back to the position of restricted testation.117  
American commentators have criticized the commonwealth system: 
[U]nguided and unprincipled use of judicial discretion can lead to results as 
arbitrary and unsatisfactory as those under a system of fixed rules applied 
unswervingly to everyone.  Moreover, the concept of testamentary freedom 
remains more important in the United States than in other countries.  
Americans probably would object strenuously to efforts to implement a 
‘redistribution’ system, such as family maintenance, in the absence of very 
well defined, restrictive guidelines to temper judicial discretion.118
Limitations upon free testation “are, of course, familiar to the civil law, 
with its ancient pars legitima, or modern légitime.”119  In France, testamentary 
freedom became taboo after the revolution.120  The revolutionaries, including 
Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, better known as Comte de Mirabeau,121 were opposed 
to testamentary freedom because “they regarded it as a basis for the 
concentration of wealth.”122  From the revolution forward, French law 
 
 
115 Brashier, supra note 4, at 121. 
116 Id. at 121 n.125. 
117 Id. at 121-22; SIMES, supra note 2, at 22.  
118 Brashier, supra note 4, at 132-33 (citing Dainow, supra note 114, at 345 n.48, 355; Joseph 
Dainow, Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, 36 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 
1111 (1938)). 
119 Cahn, supra note 22, at 139 (citations omitted).   
120 SIMES, supra note 2, at 4. 
121 Comte de Mirabeau, a French politician who was often referred to as Mirabeau, was born 
on March 9, 1749 and died April 2, 1791.  WIKIPEDIA, Honoré Mirabeau, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honor%C3%A9_Mirabeau (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).  During the 
French Revolution, Mirabeau believed that “for a government to be strong it must be in 
harmony with the wishes of the majority of the people.”  Id.  In order to create a stronger 
government, he studied the English Constitution with the aspirations of creating a French 
system similar to the English system.  Id.  Mirabeau consolidated the National Assembly in 
1789.  Id.  After the storming of the Bastille, Mirabeau decided he needed to establish a ministry 
similar to that of the English Ministry, to be responsible and represent the people of France.  Id. 
 He devoted the rest of his life to working towards building the new French system.  Id.     
122 SIMES, supra note 2, at 4.  Note that Mirabeau may have had some personal issues relating 
to the subject as well, as he had been a disinherited younger son.  Id. at 5.  Mirabeau may, 
however, have had clarity on this issue on his deathbed.  Orrin K. McMurray, Liberty of 
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incorporated forced heirship in favor of both descendants and ascendants, but 
not the surviving spouse as he or she was protected by community property 
principles.123  At death, the assets of the community are equally divided, 
operating the same as in the divorce context.124
In 1815, when discussing forced disposition, Robert Stewart, known as 
Lord Castlereagh,125 said, “It is unnecessary to destroy France, the Civil Code 
will take care of that.”126  These forced disposition laws in France,127 and many 
other developed and non-developed countries, have caused very large 
percentages of middle- and upper-class citizens to transfer their property inter 
vivos to asset protection jurisdictions – a situation that is not healthy for the 
economy or the family unity of these countries. 
Among other ills,128 these harsh restrictions on testamentary freedom in 
France have been blamed for very low rates of testamentary charitable 
 
Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILL. L. REV. 96, 97 (1919-1920) (“And 
there can scarcely be found a better example of the folly of a purely rationalistic treatment of a 
great and ancient legal institution than is afforded by the fact that Mirabeau made a death-bed 
will on the very morning of the day that Talleyrand read his ‘testament politique.’  The same 
inconsistency has been charged to Plato, who like Mirabeau criticized the will, and like him 
died testate.” (citation omitted)). 
123 See SIMES, supra note 2, at 6. 
124 GLENDON, supra note 14, at 246. 
125 Robert Stewart, later titled Lord Castlereagh, was born on June 18, 1769 in Ireland.  
Spartacus Educational, Lord Castlereagh, at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/PRcastle 
reagh. htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).  In 1794, Castlereagh claimed a seat in the English 
House of Commons.  Id.  In 1797, he was appointed as Irish Chief Secretary to William Pitt.  Id. 
 Together, they decided the best way to stop the religious conflict in Ireland was to unite with 
the rest of Britain.  Id.  The plan, however, was very unpopular and Castlereagh refused to serve 
under the new Prime Minister.  Id.  After being reappointed several years later, Castlereagh 
defeated Napoleon, and focused his concentrations on improving Britain.  Id.  His hoped 
improvements failed, leading to the downfall of his popularity, as well as his suicide on August 
12, 1822.  Id.    
126 McMurray, supra note 122, at 112. 
127 See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 8 (France “has severely prescribed distribution of an 
estate at death.  With few exceptions, beneficiaries are immediate family members.”). 
128 See McMurray, supra note 122, at 112-13.  For example, “M. Le Play . . . finds in the 
system of enforced partition the destruction of the family, of morality, religion, and industry, the 
cause of the declining birth rate, of the increase in crime, of stock gambling and fraudulent 
promotions of financial enterprises, indeed, all the evils of modern society.”  
 
Id. at 112.  
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bequests129 and very little privately funded research.130  Contrast that with the 
“relatively healthy state” of American charities, at least partially due to 
testamentary charitable bequests facilitated by a larger degree of testamentary 
freedom.131
In America, freedom of testation evolved quite differently than it evolved 
in England.132  Early on, we as a country made the decision to reject the French 
concept of forced dispositions of one’s property to family members other than 
the surviving spouse.133  Oddly, America incorporated civil law concepts of 
forced disposition, but only with respect to surviving spouses and not other 
family members (except in Louisiana, where the Code Napoléon forms the 
basis of their civil law134) – a disconnect that is not easily explained.135
There are numerous rationales put forth by philosophers and scholars from 
ancient times on to support testamentary freedom.136
A. Testamentary Freedom is a Natural Right Worthy of Protection  
It would be robbery to deprive a man of the right to dispose by will all that 
which he owns.  The soul is immortal137 and must not be deprived of the 
exercise of its rights.138
 
 
 
129 See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 8 (“The severe restrictions on testamentary freedom 
in France have not been conducive to the development of charitable foundations and agencies 
having the functions of public service and research.”). 
130 Id. at 312.  
131 Id. 
132 SIMES, supra note 2, at 12-13.  
133 Id. at 15.  This Article does not explicitly deal with the issues surrounding disinheritance 
of children and family members other than spouses.  For a recent article on forced heirship vis-
à-vis children, see Brashier, supra note 4.  
134 SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 26. 
135 See GLENDON, supra note 14, at 245 (“In American law, the forced share operates in favor 
of the spouse rather than descendants and ascendants, as, for example, in the French system.”). 
136 See Adam J. Hirsch & William K. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. 
L.J. 1, 6 (1992) (noting that “traditional rationales for testamentary freedom are as varied as 
they are controversial”). 
137 Cahn, supra note 22, at 145.  The author concurs with Cahn on this point: “We shall dodge 
the question of the immortality of the soul (concerning which the statutes are ambiguous and the 
reported cases nil).”  Id. at 146. 
138 Id. at 145 (citing LUIGI MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 748-50 (1912)); see 
also BOWE ET AL., supra note 81, § 1.7.  
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Locke and Grotius believed that testators have a natural right to leave 
property at death freely, having created that wealth.139  It is a widely-held tenet 
of natural law that a person has a property interest in the fruits of her labor.  
Depriving a person of the ability to dispose freely of these fruits violates this 
basic concept of the bundle of rights: “[p]roperty clearly is not viewed as a 
unitary right.  Instead, it is viewed as a ‘multilithic’ concept that includes a 
‘bundle’ of disparate rights, including the right to use something, the right to 
prevent others from using it, and the right to transfer your rights to someone 
else.”140  In traditional common law, citizens believed that property was 
something tangible that they had the right to own.141  Their rights, however, 
did not stop with ownership, but rather were coupled with the “right to use, 
sell, give away, leave idle, or destroy” their own property.142   
B. Testamentary Freedom Provides an Incentive to Work 
There would be no incentive to ingenuity, productiveness and thrift unless 
a man could direct the enjoyment of his property after his death.143
One, of many, reasons people work hard throughout their lives includes 
the opportunity to pass the fruits of their labor to whomever they choose at 
their deaths.144   
Curtailment of testamentary freedom has been unpopular largely because of a 
belief that beneficial economic and social effects result from a policy of 
allowing nearly unrestricted transfers of wealth at death.  The accumulation 
of property and control of its transfer at death is thought to breed ingenuity, 
initiative, creativity, and self-reliance.145   
 
 
139 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 136, at 6 (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT §§ 27, 305-06, 329 (2d ed. 1970) (1690); 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC 
PACIS LIBRI TRES 265 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625)). 
140 A. Mechele Dickerson, From Jeans to Genes: The Evolving Nature of Property of the 
Estate, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 287-88 (1999) (citations omitted).   
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Cahn, supra note 22, at 145. 
144 See FRIEDRICH, THE ECONOMICS OF INHERITANCE, in 1 SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL 
CONCEPTS 27, 33 (E. Cahn ed., 1948). 
145 Fellows et al., supra note 101, at 333 (citing ATKINSON, supra note 102, at 34-35; 2 F.W. 
TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 288-309, 564-66 (4th ed. 1939); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY § 26.1, at 409, § 26.3 (James A. Casner ed., 1952); Calvin Coolidge, The Harmful 
Economic Effects of Existing Estate Taxation in the United States, 29 ECON. WORLD 305 (1925); 
A.W. Mellon, Economic Aspects of Estate and Inheritance Taxation, 39 TR. CO. 708-10 (1924); 
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“[B]inding a property owner to fixed, unalterable laws of distribution 
psychologically thwarts the property instinct in man, and is therefore in 
opposition to his nature.”146  The only thing one has to do is to watch the 
documentary Born Rich to see the effect that guaranteed wealth has on 
individuals.147  Anecdotally, any estate planner that works with high net worth 
individuals and their families would say the same thing.  “‘[G]uaranteed 
inheritances cause heirs to cease to work and so reduces the total wealth of the 
country.’”148
C. Testamentary Freedom Leads to an Optimal Level of Wealth Creation and 
Savings 
[T]estamentary freedom is an accommodation mechanism in American 
society.  It functions to meet multiple demands: those of continuity; a 
multilineal descent system; values that espouse freedom, democracy, and 
rationality; and a complex and highly differentiated modern industrial 
society.149
Freedom of testation usually facilitates the development of a complex 
society, as there “appears to be a high correlation between its exercise and the 
rise in societal complexity.”150  With the erosion of testamentary freedom 
comes the erosion of savings and a lack of production.151  In the thirteenth 
century, Henry de Bracton believed that testamentary freedom was an 
incentive to industry and savings, a view that is widely held among scholars.152 
 
JEROME NATHANSON, THE ETHICS OF INHERITANCE, in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 74 
(Edmond N. Cahn ed., 1948)). 
146 BOWE ET AL., supra note 81, § 1.7, at 35. 
147 BORN RICH (HBO Cinemax 2003).  Most of the “cast,” including the writer/director Jamie 
Johnson, have guaranteed assets either already in their names or irrevocably in trusts for their 
benefit.  Id. 
148 Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to Be Born Rich: The American Law of Disinheritance and 
a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1221 
(1990) (quoting R.D. OUGHTON & EDWARD L. TYLER, TYLER’S FAMILY PROVISION 32-33 (2d. ed. 
1984)); see also Gerald Le Van, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 29, 34 (1977) 
(arguing that “the French compromise not only ‘atomizes successions,’ but also takes away 
from the privileged heir that economic incentive that would otherwise keep him active and 
diligent”).  
149 SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 4. 
150 Id. at 7. 
151 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution, and the Concept of Balanced 
Growth Path Incidence, 86 J. POL. ECON. S. 138 (1978). 
152 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 136, at 7-8 (citing 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
CIVIL CODE, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 338 (John Bowring ed., 1962); 2 
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 For the most part, individuals enjoy bequeathing their assets to the donees of 
their choice.  Testamentary freedom, then, creates a real incentive to be 
productive and accumulate wealth.153  Property values decline with loss of 
testamentary freedom, which in turn removes incentives for wealth creation.154 
 “[T]o dictate the persons who shall be a man’s successors and to deny 
freedom of testation might discourage frugality, thrift and individual 
initiative.”155
D. Testamentary Freedom Promotes the Creation of Greater Stocks of 
Noncommodity Wealth 
The testator’s power to bequeath encourages her beneficiaries to provide 
her with care and comfort – services that add to the total economic “pie”.156
 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 58, at 11; 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF 
ENGLAND 182 (George E. Woodbine ed., 1968); 1 FRANCIS HUTCHENSON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 352 (1755); 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 221 
(Colonial Press 1899) (1848); ATKINSON, supra note 102, at 34; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS 
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 165 (1988); Gordon Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J.L. & ECON. 
465 (1971)). 
Bracton’s assumption – shared by modern social scientists – was that persons derive 
satisfaction out of bequeathing property to others.  To the extent that lawmakers 
deny persons the opportunity to bequeath freely, the subjective value of property 
will drop, for one of its potential uses will have disappeared.  As a result, thwarted 
testators will choose to accumulate less property, and the total stock of wealth 
existing at any given time will shrink.  Testamentary freedom accordingly fulfills 
the normative goal of wealth maximization, which is advanced by its proponents as 
the best available barometer of utility maximization. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
153 Korpus, supra note 100, at 554 (citing Hirsch & Wang, supra note 136, at 12).  Renowned 
legal scholar Richard Posner’s terminology for this concept is “wealth maximization.”  Michael 
Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and 
Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163, 177 (1997) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS 
OF JUSTICE 13-115 (1981)).  “Posner believes that as the value of property decreases, people will 
accumulate less property.  Hence, the total amount of wealth will decrease.”  Id. at n.83 (citing 
POSNER, supra, at 13-115). 
154 Korpus, supra note 100, at 554 (citing Hirsch and Wang, supra note 136, at 12). 
155 BOWE ET AL., supra note 81, § 1.7, at 35. 
156 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 136, at 10. 
Another argument for freedom of testation, also premised upon the goal of wealth 
enhancement is that such freedom supports, as it were, a market for the provision of 
social services.  Social life, like commercial life, is not a one-way street.  Though 
classified by the law as “gratuitous” transfers, bequests within the family may in fact 
repay the beneficiary for “value” received (though of a sort not recognized as 
consideration under the common law).  What Lord Hobhouse termed “the delicate 
interdependence of Parent and Child” could wither were testamentary freedom 
2006] WHY SHOULDN’T I BE ALLOWED 759 
 
                                                                                                                
Some people are loyal and responsible to those they should be without the 
prospect of being compensated at some point, but sadly, many might not be so 
attentive without economic incentives to do so.157  In 1923, one social 
commentator observed that testamentary freedom “encourages family virtue, 
represses vice, assures the testator against ingratitude, and generally keeps the 
family house in order.”158  In 1870, one English court said: 
It is one of the most painful consequences of extreme old age that it ceases to 
excite interest and is apt to be left solitary and neglected.  The control which 
the law still gives to a man over the disposal of his property is one of the most 
efficient means which he has in protracted life to command the attentions due 
to his infirmities.159
 
 As King Lear found out after his daughters’ shares of his estate were 
secure, sometimes individuals need a little (or a lot) of monetary incentive to 
treat others decently.160
 
 
denied, a point made by many legal scholars (and dramatists) beginning with 
Bracton and hinted at still earlier in scripture and classical philosophy.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
157 Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical 
Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 434 (2001). 
158 SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 212 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, UTILITARIAN BASIS OF 
SUCCESSION, in THE RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 420-21 (John H. Wigmore ed., 
1923)).  Sussman points out that this view was shared by some in a telephone survey he had 
performed, eliciting in particular the following two responses to a question relating to when a 
testator should be free to disinherit family members: “If you were a Catholic and couldn’t 
divorce your wife, but you wanted to, then you shouldn’t have to leave her your money” and “If 
you had a second wife and she was no damn good.”  Id.  See also Batts, supra note 148, at 1220 
(quoting OUGHTON & TYLER, supra note 148, at 32). 
159 BOWE ET AL., supra note 81, § 1.7, at 35 (quoting Banks v. Goodfellow, 5 L.R.Q.B. 549 
(1870)). Bowe summarizes, “To bind a person to an intestate scheme might destroy parental 
control, and deprive a person of the ability to reward kindness and punish cruelty.”  Id. 
160 W. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 88 (1988).  “How sharper than a 
serpent’s tooth it is [t]o have a thankless child!”  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 
4. In the play, the eldest daughters – Goneril and Regan – professed their total and undying love 
for King Lear, their father.  Id. at act 1, sc. 1.  To show how pleased he was, he split his land 
between the two.  Id.  His youngest daughter, Cordelia, refused to shower her father with 
confessions of love for him, but instead told him that she loved him as any child should love 
their father.  Id.  This displeased King Lear so much that he left Cordelia with no land.  Id.  The 
irony behind the play, however, was that after the eldest daughters received their land, they 
showed their true feelings of ungratefulness and disrespect for their father.  Id. at act 2, sc. 4.  
They mistreated King Lear to such an extent that he went to stay with Cordelia.  Id.  Unlike her 
sisters, Cordelia welcomed King Lear into her home, and treated him with the utmost respect, 
love, and kindness, just as she had earlier promised.  Id. at act 4, sc. 4, 7. 
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E. Testamentary Freedom Increases Efficiency by Allowing Testators to Direct 
Assets to Those with the Greatest Need 
[D]istribution of the decedent’s resources in response to the particular 
needs of family members is . . . a social virtue, one that freedom of testation 
promotes.161
Freedom of testation is inapposite to the wasteful practice of the elective 
share that blindly distributes assets, not based on need, but based on the 
uninformed morality of state legislatures.162  Testamentary freedom helps to 
reduce the necessity of governmental support systems for the poor because a 
testator can direct property to those family members, close or distant in 
relation, that have the greatest need once immediate family members have 
enough property.163  As one commentator noted, “Indeed, it is probable that 
through the centuries freedom of testation has been used more as an instrument 
of family protection than as a weapon of disinheritance.”164
F. Testamentary Freedom is Inherent in the Ability to Control Property Inter 
Vivos 
[T]estamentary freedom is . . . “a logical extension of an owner’s freedom 
to deal with his property during his lifetime.”165
If one is free to transfer property titled in a person’s sole name during their 
lifetime,166 then why should that right change just because one dies?  The fact 
that individuals have comparatively less freedom of disposition at death than 
they do during life creates real inefficiencies and inconveniences.  As a 
practical matter, decedents cannot retain assets until they die and are forced to 
 
 
161 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 136, at 12. 
162 See id. 
163 SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 311. 
164 W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW’S SHARE 40 (1960) (citing cf. JEAN BRISSAUD, 
A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 621-22 (R. Howell trans., 1912)). 
165  Batts, supra note 148, at 1219 (quoting OUGHTON & TYLER, supra note 148, at 31); see 
also Hirsch & Wang, supra note 136, at 3 (noting the assertion of other commentators that “the 
right to consume property while alive carries with it by necessary implication an absolute right 
to control it forever” (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 304 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, 
Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 704-
05, 710-13 (1986))).  
166 See Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 
243 (2001) (“During life, a person has virtually complete control over her property.  She can 
give it to whomever she pleases.  She can assist the needy, reward the meritorious, or simply 
indulge a whim.  So long as the property owner remains competent, that control continues until 
death.”).    
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dispose of them prematurely by making lifetime gifts to beneficiaries.167  
Because virtually all inter vivos gifts are irrevocable,168 this can lead to all 
sorts of problematic issues, including: post-gift relationship deterioration 
between donor and donee;169 post-gift financial deterioration of donor forcing 
the donor to rely on friends, family or the government for support;170 loss of 
control over the assets;171 loss of control over the donee’s behavior;172 and 
“family disharmony caused by unequal gifts to family members or gifts to 
nonrelatives.”173
G. Fairness Issue 
[F]reedom of testation remains available to those decedents with enough 
wealth to be well-advised.174
As discussed in more detail below, there is increasingly a distinction 
between those that can afford testamentary freedom (through the high fees of 
competent advisors) and those that cannot.  This distinction is shameful and 
should be eliminated. 
Absent converting to community property concepts, there is no way to 
produce an effective elective share law. 175  If a jurisdiction wishes to retain 
separate property concepts, then elective share laws should be eliminated to 
give everyone a fair playing field and eliminate these wasteful efforts of the 
privileged.  “For the vulnerable testator . . . who does not have the best legal 
advice, the family paradigm [embodied in the elective share and similar laws] 
can be virtually a confiscator of property.”176  Note that the burdens of 
testamentary freedom restrictions tend to fall on “unnatural” beneficiaries such 
 
 
167 Id. at 244. 
168 Id. at 273 n.229 (“Outright inter vivos gifts are irrevocable.” (citing GERRY W. BEYER, 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 262 (1999))). 
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Id. (citing BEYER, supra note 168, at 262). 
172 Id. (citing BEYER, supra note 168, at 262); see also discussion supra Part IV.D. 
173 Id. (citing BEYER, supra note 168, at 262). 
174 Pennell, supra note 13, § 905. 
175 See discussion infra Part V.   
176 Foster, supra note 166, at 244.  
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as non-immediate family members, caregivers, same-sex partners, and 
others.177
V. MODIFICATION OF ELECTIVE SHARE IN SEPARATE PROPERTY 
JURISDICTIONS 
Forced-share law is the law of the second best.  It undertakes upon death 
to correct the failure of a separate-property state to create the appropriate 
lifetime rights for spouses in each other’s earnings.178
Legislatures need to address head-on the goals of their marital property 
systems generally, and elective share statutes specifically.  They should decide 
first which theory their elective share law should be based on: the support 
theory,179 the marital partnership theory,180 or the contract theory.181  It is 
currently a confused jumble: 
As it is, both the policy justifications and the effect of these rules are flawed, 
confused, or conflicted.  To illustrate simply, most statutes cannot even 
choose whether they are based on a support theory (that is, the surviving 
spouse should not be left destitute and therefore a ward of the state) or an 
economic partnership theory (that is, everything acquired by investment or 
industry by either spouse during the marriage should belong to them equally, 
as in community property).  This easily is shown by the vast divergence in 
size of the share from state to state.  For example, the surviving spouse’s 
share can range from a low of 0 percent to a high of 50 percent under the new 
Uniform Probate Code accrual share regime (indicating a marital partnership 
approach, based on the length of the marriage) but with a support allowance 
 
 
177 Id. at 273 n.227 (noting that “only the wealthy may have the luxury to provide for a 
beneficiary society regards as ‘unnatural’” (quoting Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of 
Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 988 (1999))). 
178 Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 100, at 306; see also Brashier, supra note 4, at 151 
n.225. 
179 The support theory of marital property states that all property is considered marital 
property except for “property acquired by means of gift or inheritance.”  HARRY D. KRAUSE & 
DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY LAW, IN A NUTSHELL § 22.2 (4th ed. 2003).  The surviving spouse has 
an interest in the property “according to title,” and the marital property is divided.  Id.   
180 Under the marital partnership theory, “all property owned by the parties, even if acquired 
before the marriage and held separately ever since, may be reallocated . . . .”  Id. 
181 The contract theory of marital property allows “one or both parties to waive their spousal 
rights” altogether.  ANDERSEN & BLOOM, supra note 23, § 6.01[E].  Note that if one espouses the 
contract theory of marriage, i.e., marriage is a contract between competent adults, “then neither 
the arbitrary elective share nor community property is necessary because the spouses may 
protect themselves before and during the marriage without state intrusion.”  Brashier, supra note 
4, at 88. 
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in all cases (the Uniform Probate Code § 2-202(b) Supplemental Elective 
Share Amount, based on the spouse’s other property and property received 
outside of probate).  In some states the share can be as high as 100% in 
certain cases.  And, those states that still reflect a one-third share presumably 
are attributable to the dower/curtesy origins of elective share statutes, which 
arguably are not informed by either the support or the marital partnership 
theories.  
.  .  .  . 
The conflicted underpinnings of these statutes is especially well illustrated by 
the fact that, in virtually all states, the election is denied if the spouse has died 
before an election is made.  Quaere how to justify a marital partnership 
theory underlying these statutes if the surviving spouse’s property right 
substitute is defeated merely by the accident of dying before making the 
claim.  This bespeaks a support theory, but it should not inform an accrual 
entitlement that increases with the length of the marriage.  The conflict also is 
illustrated almost everywhere by the fact that an election made on behalf of 
an incapacitated surviving spouse must be justified based on need.  Again, if 
the statutes reflect a marital partnership surrogate for community property, 
why should need or death of the spouse before completion of the election 
process be critical at all?182
Another example of this confused identity is that some jurisdictions allow 
the elective share to be satisfied by life interests in property held in trust or 
otherwise, while other jurisdictions do not.183  In the former, the support theory 
can be seen, whereas the latter suggests the partnership theory.184
Finally, in most states, a surviving spouse that has abandoned a decedent 
spouse is still entitled to his or her elective share.185  Again, does this really 
comport with the notions of partnership theory?186  All of this can get 
confusing for even the most respected scholars.187
 
 
182 Pennell, supra note 13, § 905 (citing Thomas Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse’s 
Forced Share Be Retained?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223 (1987)); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 425, 432; see generally American College of Trust and Estate Counsel 
(“ACTEC”), Study 10: Surviving Spouse’s Rights to Share in Deceased Spouse’s Estate (1994); 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-212(a) (amended 2003); In re Estate of Crane, 649 N.Y.S.2d 1006 
(N.Y. Sur. Ct., Erie Co. 1996).  
183 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 425. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 433. 
186 Id. (suggesting that perhaps the elective share should only apply to the property owned by 
the decedent-spouse at the time the surviving spouse abandoned the decedent-spouse, an 
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The Uniform Probate Code’s elective share provisions go the farthest in 
attempting to implement the partnership theory.188  With a sliding percentage 
ranging from zero percent to fifty percent, the UPC awards the surviving 
spouse a higher percentage of the decedent-spouse’s assets the longer the 
marriage lasts on the theory that the longer the marriage, the greater the 
amount of property acquired through marriage partnership efforts.189
  But even this seems like the poor man’s community property system.  As 
the epigram under the heading of this section indicates, the 1990 UPC drafters 
concur. 
A. Community Property 
Resolved, [t]hat the laws of property, as affecting married parties, demand 
a thorough revisal, so that all rights may be equal between them; – that the 
wife may have, during life, an equal control over the property gained by their 
mutual toil and sacrifices, be heir to her husband precisely to the extent that 
he is heir to her, and entitled, at her death, to dispose by will of the same share 
of the joint property as he is.190
This resolution could have been passed yesterday.  Sadly, though, it was 
proclaimed in 1850.191  We have not made much headway in implementing 
community property laws, but we absolutely should.  Limiting a decedent’s 
control over his property is really a right with no force if there is no parallel 
limit on property transfers during lifetime.   
 
arrangement that can be compared to the California community property laws that deem 
earnings acquired after separation not to be community property). 
187 For example, in one edition of his classic book, Jesse Dukeminier seemingly states the 
elective share purpose to be based on the support theory.  JESSE DUKEMINIER, JR. & STANLEY M. 
JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, FUTURE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE 
PLANNING 461-63 (1st ed. 1972) (“noting that forced share was [a] result of concern for wife’s 
possible disinheritance and the limited protection afforded by dower”).  However, in a later 
version, he states the elective share purpose to be based on the marital partnership theory.  JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, 377-78 (4th ed. 1990) 
(policy underlying elective share is the same as that underlying community property – to 
recognize the spouse’s contribution to the economic success of the marriage).  See also 
Brashier, supra note 4, at 151 n.225.  
188 See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2, general cmt. (amended 1993). 
189 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 427. 
190 O’Conner, supra note 5, at 261 (quoting THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS 
CONVENTION, HELD AT WORCESTER, OCTOBER 23RD & 24TH, 1850 (Boston, Prentiss & Sawyer 
1851), cited in Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning 
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1113 (1994)). 
191 Id.   
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“How can a restraint on testamentary power be made effective without a 
corresponding restraint on the inter vivos power of disposition?”192  If a 
separate property jurisdiction is really interested in implementing a system that 
tracks most closely the marital partnership theory of marriage, then there is no 
question that it should simply (though perhaps not so simply) switch to a 
community property theory of marriage and property disposition.193   
The community property theory of asset distribution194 is much more 
effective at protecting the non-wage earning spouse, especially during life, as 
 
 
192 SIMES, supra note 2, at 25; see also GLENDON, supra note 14, at 245 (arguing that the 
principal weakness of the American forced share “is that it can be defeated by lifetime transfers 
that deplete the estate”). 
193 Brashier, supra note 4, at 88.  Note that only nine states currently have a system of 
community property: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (West 1998)), California (CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2004)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Michie 2003)), Louisiana (LA. 
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (West 1985)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (Michie 
1989)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-2 (Michie 1978)), Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
3.002 (Vernon 1998)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 2000)), and 
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.001 (West 2001)).  Alaska allows spouses to choose whether 
to be subject to community or separate property (ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.030 (Michie 1998)).  
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 455.  These states, however, represent over one-fourth of 
the U.S. population.  Id.  As summarized by Dukeminier: 
Community property in the United States is a community of acquests: Husband and 
wife own the earnings and acquisitions from earnings of both spouses during 
marriage in undivided equal shares.  Whatever is bought with earnings is community 
property.  All property that is not community property is the separate property of 
one spouse or the other or, in the case of a tenancy in common or joint tenancy, of 
both.  Separate property includes property acquired before marriage and property 
acquired during marriage by gift or inheritance.  In Idaho, Louisiana, and Texas, 
income from separate property is community property.  In the other community 
property states, income from separate property retains its separate character. 
. . . .   
Almost all community property states follow the theory that husband and wife own 
equal shares in each item of community property at death.   
Id. at 455, 457. 
194 To be clear, there are two types of community property utilized in the world: the Spanish 
system in use in America today and the universal community system, of Germanic origin, used 
in Roman-Dutch law.  In the Germanic system, “all property owned by either spouse at the time 
of the marriage becomes community property when the marriage is entered into,” and any 
property, regardless of source, obtained during marriage becomes community property.  
Brashier, supra note 4, at 95 n.38.  The current UPC elective share provisions purport to employ 
this universal community approach at the death of a spouse, despite the fact that no American 
jurisdiction utilizes the universal community property system during life.  Id.  As John Lennon 
might say, “Strange days indeed; strange days indeed.”  JOHN LENNON, NOBODY TOLD ME 
(Polydor Records 1984). 
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he or she has an immediate property interest in any property deemed earnings 
during the marriage.  There are significant limitations on the rights of one 
spouse to transfer community property without spousal consent.195  If 
implemented properly, this would close most of the loopholes inherent in even 
the best separate property elective share law.196  Prohibiting a person from 
disposing of his or her property in the manner of his or her choice at death will 
only lead to a bizarre race against the clock to give away property as death 
approaches, and who knows when that will be?  This approach requires 
individuals to be both psychic and quick in order to fulfill their wishes.  Most 
likely, they will not be both, thus frustrating a primary tenet of both property 
law (the right to do with your property what you choose) and decedents’ 
estates law (that the testator’s intent is paramount).  As one scholar notes, “If 
we prevented them from bestowing it in the open and explicit mode of bequest, 
we could not prevent them from transferring it before the close of their lives, 
and we should open a door to vexatious and perpetual litigation.”197
Commentators have agreed with this view, noting, for example, that 
“‘eventually all states will have to abandon elective or forced share law and 
adopt some sort of community property system’” if the partnership theory of 
marriage is to be implemented nationwide,198 and that: 
To the extent that the elective share is now being recharacterized as a 
posthumous means of correcting deficiencies in the common law system of 
ownership of marital property, legislatures should instead focus their 
attention on correcting that system during the marriage, not at its end.  If 
states wish to view marriage as an economic partnership in which 
contributions of each spouse should be recognized, then they must adopt 
community property principles, not forced share statutes that provide 
 
 
195 See Oldham, supra note 92, at 229; Kathy T. Graham, The Uniform Marital Property Act: 
A Solution for Common Law Property Systems?, 48 S.D. L. REV. 455, 464 (2002-2003) (For 
example, § 6 of the Uniform Marital Property Act, which seeks to implement community 
property concepts on a uniform basis, “restricts the ability of a spouse to gift marital property 
valued in excess of five hundred dollars.”). 
196 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 456-57. 
197 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 136, at 11 (quoting WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING 
POLITICAL JUSTICE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON MODERN MORALS AND HAPPINESS 718-19 (Penguin 
Books 1985) (1793)); see also 1 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 352 
(1755) (“Take away this right and . . . men must be forced into a pretty hazardous conduct by 
actually giving away during life whatever they acquire beyond their own probable 
consumption.”). 
198 Brashier, supra note 4, at 152 n.226 (quoting Whitebread, supra note 94, at 142). 
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recognition of spousal contributions only to the survivor when the marriage is 
terminated by death.199
 
 Feminist scholars, in addition, have heaped quite harsh criticism – rightly 
so – on the continued separate property regimes in most jurisdictions.200
The greatest injustice associated with separate property systems (even with 
the newest elective share statute) is the situation where the non-earning spouse 
dies first.201  In that case, he or she would have no ability to devise any 
property that the earning spouse accumulated during the marriage to his or her 
children.202  With multiple marriages (perhaps each with children) becoming 
more commonplace, society can no longer assume that both spouses have 
identical testamentary intentions.203  So much for the UPC’s promise of 
implementing the marital partnership theory.204
B. Distribution at Death Should Be More Consistent With Distribution Upon 
Divorce 
In general, the state says to the widow, “We give you this compulsory or 
elective share because you need it, but we will not ask how much you do need 
or whether you need anything at all.”205
A consensus has developed in the past few decades regarding the method 
of property distribution at divorce, with both separate and community property 
 
 
199 Id. at 152 (citations omitted). 
200 See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: The Kingdom of the Fathers, 10 LAW & 
INEQ. 137, 150-51 (1991) (arguing that modern estate planning, from the female viewpoint, has 
not progressed much past the fourteenth century).  Fellows notes: “How else can we explain the 
continuing reliance in the majority of states on inheritance and forced share rights, rather than 
the community-property system, to acknowledge the contribution and support needs of 
spouses?”  Id. 
201 Id. at 151 (“Recognizing a wife’s claim to the marital estate only if she survives is wholly 
consistent with the maintenance (or vessel) ideology of the fourteenth century.  It denies the 
wife the right to testamentary control over capital except, and only reluctantly, when practicality 
demands this solution.”). 
202 Oldham, supra note 92, at 229. 
203 Id. at 235. 
204 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 427; see also Whitebread, supra note 94, at 140-44 
(discussing the benefits of converting to community property, and noting that the conversion to 
the Uniform Marital Property Act would be easier than most believe and that it has gone well in 
the one state that has adopted it (i.e., Wisconsin)). 
205 Cahn, supra note 22, at 146; see also Foster, supra note 166, at 219-20 (elective share 
laws “award property mechanically on the basis of fixed rules, with virtually no consideration 
for the actual circumstances or needs of the surviving spouse” (citation omitted)). 
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jurisdictions moving in the direction of equitable distribution, i.e., family law 
courts can divide property accumulated by either spouse if acquired through 
the spouse’s efforts.206  This type of division best reflects the marital 
partnership view of marriage – that the spouses should share the fruits of the 
marital effort, no more and no less.207
Neither the partnership nor the support theory of marriage would allow a 
surviving spouse to have any interest, either at divorce or at death, in property 
received by the decedent spouse through inheritance and gifts or from property 
owned before marriage.208  These assets are clearly not derived from a marital 
partnership and support should come, if at all, from assets earned during the 
marriage.  Many separate property jurisdictions today, as well as the Uniform 
Probate Code, give the surviving spouse a share of total assets (including 
inheritance and premarital assets); therefore, there is decidedly less consensus 
between community and separate property states regarding division of 
property at death.209  This is a non-trivial issue given the very large sums that 
are expected to be passed from one generation to the next via inheritance over 
the next few decades.210
Property distribution at divorce is governed to a significantly lesser degree 
by bright line rules, and many more of the concepts of equity come into play.  
The elective share laws in separate property states give the surviving spouse a 
fixed percentage, whether on the sliding scale of the Uniform Probate Code or 
the one-third or one-half that the other elective share laws yield.211  “By 
necessity it operates upon a mechanical theory of justice, since obviously no 
statute can allocate family wealth according to the needs of the individual 
spouse.”212   
 
 
206 Oldham, supra note 92, at 223. 
207 Id. at 223-24. 
208 Id. at 223. 
209 Id. at 224. 
210 Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage Into Elective-Share 
Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-
Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 517 (2000) (“According to a relatively recent study, 
the generation commonly referred to as the ‘Baby Boomers’ can expect to inherit some $10.4 
trillion over the fifty-year period from 1990 to 2040, with the average size of each of the 
projected 115 million bequests being slightly more than $90,000 (both amounts stated in 1989 
dollars).”). 
211 Pennell, supra note 13, § 905. 
212 Chaffin, supra note 21, at 459. 
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Divorce laws consider “numerous factors such as relative contributions to 
the marriage, length of the union, and the moral and financial standing of the 
spouses.”213  The two schemes are fundamentally different, but should they be? 
  
 In cases where the spouse objects to being denied a sufficient outright 
bequest (however that is defined), one proposal for reform is for the English 
approach to be utilized: allow the judge to consider the equities of the situation 
based on factors similar to the divorce setting and set out a more tailored 
solution than currently exists.214  As the Pennell study shows, in a state where 
disinheritance is both legal and easy, there would not be a large number of 
instances where this discretion would come into play.215  As one commentator 
noted almost forty years ago: 
If the need is great for the individual, but small in a number of cases involved 
and in total individuals affected, rough justice may be poorer justice than the 
situation requires.  We may be able to afford the luxury of individuation; to 
protect the surviving spouse who has genuine need, protect the testator’s 
dispositive plan when there is no such need, and do it all without an undue 
burden on the courts.216
 
 
213 Pennell, supra note 13, § 905 (citing J. GREGORY, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
(1989)). 
214 Id.  This approach is summarized well as follows: 
An alternative is to provide a system of maintenance payments to the surviving 
spouse . . . payable out of the decedent’s estate.  The amount of the payments would 
be keyed to the individual need of the survivor, the interests of persons who 
otherwise would be entitled to the deceased’s property, the conduct of the survivor 
with relation to the deceased, the deceased’s reasons for his dispositions, and the 
many other factors that might be relevant in a particular case.  This is essentially the 
system established by the British Commonwealth decedent’s family maintenance 
legislation.   
Plager, supra note 35, at 682 (citing Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, 
ch. 45 (Eng.); Family Protection Act of 1900, 64 Vict., No. 20 (N.Z.), amended by 11 Geo. 6, 
No. 60, § 15 (1947)); see generally Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary 
Freedom: A Report on Decedents’ Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 277 
(1955). 
215 Pennell, supra note 13, § 905. 
216 Plager, supra note 35, at 683. 
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Placing more discretion in courts has, however, drawn broad criticism 
from commentators.217
VI. COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ELECTIVE SHARE STATUTES 
The responsible family member should not be coerced by legal restrictions 
to take care of his family: he ought to have the privilege of doing it of his own 
volition.218
The concept of no dower or elective share law in separate property states 
has been around for a long time, but has never caught on – why?  In this age of 
political correctness, are we as a society just afraid to debate the subject in a 
meaningful way?   
Right now, Georgia is the only separate property jurisdiction that does not 
have an elective share law.219  In addition, for most of the twentieth century, 
North Dakota and South Dakota did not have dower or an elective share 
statute.220   
In the past, multiple commentators – many at the top of their field – have 
supported the notion of eliminating the elective share laws.  But these 
arguments have been met with the silence of perceived political correctness 
and not the debate of informed policymakers.  It is time for that to change. 
A. Elective Share Statutes Are Less Necessary 
The underlying reason for statutory protection legislation is the basic 
notion that a man should not disinherit his wife.  However compelling this 
postulate may have been in earlier times, it does not loom as important in 
 
 
217 See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 14, at 246 (“Occasionally, the English approach is 
proposed as a replacement or supplement to present American systems, but it has found no 
acceptance.”).  Another scholar viewed this system as follows: 
The English system could create problems, however.  Although this system seems to 
work well in England, some have been concerned that American surviving spouses 
would frequently litigate to determine whether they had adequate resources to 
provide for their support, and what would constitute a “reasonable” support award 
from the estate.  Also, this system probably would complicate the administration of 
many decedents’ estates.  If the estate had an obligation to support a surviving 
spouse for life, a significant reserve would have to be maintained; it would not be 
clear what property could be transferred from the estate to a devisee.   
Oldham, supra note 92, at 230-31.  
218 SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 293. 
219 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-9 (1982). 
220 Brashier, supra note 4, at 88 n.16. 
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modern society as it once did.  Within the past several years serious questions 
have been raised as to the need for such protective legislation.221
In today’s society, the elective share is not as necessary as it was in prior 
generations.  The balancing test – between protection of surviving female 
spouses and testamentary freedom – that policymakers have instinctively used 
throughout the ages should now squarely tip the scales in favor of eliminating 
forced heirship laws favoring surviving spouses.   
It seems that the rhetoric associated with forced spousal heirship is 
premised on a number of myths that simply are not true in today’s society. 
1. Disinheritance Very Seldom Occurs Without the Acquiescence of the 
 Surviving Spouse (Georgia on My Mind) 
Elective share and dower statutes thus may be partly based on a distorted 
perception of the disinheritance problem. . . . If spousal disinheritance is a 
problem of de minimis proportions, then the typical fractional forced share 
found in most common law states does more harm than good.  The broad 
swath cut by the fixed fraction elective share is obvious: its arbitrariness may 
be used by the survivor unjustifiably to reduce legacies to minor dependents 
and other needy members of the testator’s family.222
There have not been an overwhelming number of studies on the rate of, 
and reasons for, spousal disinheritance.  The studies that have been performed, 
though, have been clear: “The plight of the impoverished widow wronged by 
her husband’s unfair estate plan appears to be overdrawn and perhaps even 
fanciful, in light of actual experience.”223  Perhaps the best and most modern 
study on the subject comes from the most relevant jurisdiction: Georgia.  As 
the only state that allows the unfettered ability to disinherit a spouse, Georgia 
is the ideal starting point for a disinheritance study.  In 2000, Professor Jeffrey 
Pennell published a study that looked at 2,529 wills filed with probate courts 
in multiple Georgia jurisdictions designed to be a cross-section of Georgia 
society.224  On a number of fronts, the results are so stark as to be almost 
shocking. 
 
 
221 Chaffin, supra note 21, at 463. 
222 Brashier, supra note 4, at 141 (citations omitted). 
223 Chaffin, supra note 21, at 469.  “There are comparatively few instances pointing to misuse 
of the power of disposition, and there is no evidence of any determined or widespread trend of 
disinheritance or other unfairness in the planning of estates.”  Id. at 464. 
224 Pennell, supra note 13, §§ 900-906.  The 2,529 wills included 432 cases of substantial 
spousal disinheritance.  Id. § 903.  
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Of the over 2,500 relevant wills examined,225 there were only nine 
situations “in which it appeared that the provisions were objected to by the 
surviving spouse.”226  These nine situations represented an amazing 0.36 
percent of the total.227   
There were, in fact, no will contests filed in any of the disinheritance 
situations.228  Put more plainly, this means that not one of the 2,529 surviving 
spouses studied thought that they were being unfairly treated such that they 
would file suit to try and have the will deemed invalid on other grounds so 
they could take their relatively substantial intestate share.  As one 
commentator summarized: “Maybe Georgia has accidentally hit upon the 
acceptable modern answer to this centuries-old problem.”229  As another said, 
“The Georgia experience indicates there is little reason to believe that 
permitting spousal disinheritance weakens the marital relationship.”230
There have been other, less recent, disinheritance studies that show 
disinheritance has been more an illusion than a reality from the beginning of 
early America to now.231  It is remarkable how close these old studies track the 
lone modern study from Pennell.232  The biggest study, published in 1960, 
found only 0.06 percent to 0.10 percent, i.e., between six and ten 
 
 
225 The study looked only at wills “in which it was possible to identify whether there was a 
surviving spouse (and in most cases that fact was easy to establish).”  Id.  
226 Id.  Pennell rightfully reasoned that only those surviving spouses that requested a 
“widow’s election,” which provided a surviving spouse with roughly a year’s worth of support, 
were objecting to the dispositive provisions of the decedent’s will.  See id. 
227 Id.  For those math-challenged readers, this is not 36 percent, but roughly one-third of 1 
percent.  In the cases involving spousal disinheritance, the surviving spouse objected two 
percent of the time.  Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Chaffin, supra note 21, at 469. 
230 Brashier, supra note 4, at 146. 
231 See generally Plager, supra note 35, at 683-85 (reviewing a handful of older disinheritance 
studies and other older data); Brashier, supra note 4, at 140 (“The few studies that have been 
conducted indicate that disinheritance of a spouse is rare.”); R.R. Powell & C. Looker, 
Decedents’ Estates: Illumination From Probate and Tax Records, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 919 
(1930); E. Ward & J.H. Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 
393; Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 
30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241 (1962-1963); Lawrence M. Friedman, Patterns of Testation in the 19th 
Century: A Study of Essex County (New Jersey) Wills, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 34 (1964). 
232 Plager, supra note 35, at 686-87 (citing MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW’S SHARE 8 
n.9 (1960)). 
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disinheritance cases per 10,000 wills probated, were subject to dispute.233  The 
author of the study concluded that “there [was] no need in practice for a non-
barrable share for the surviving spouse; the surviving spouse [was] given much 
more than the statutory one-third in a very high percentage of the wills.”234  
Another commentator, looking at all the pre-1970 studies, concurred.235  The 
older leading article that pulled together all relevant studies released prior to its 
publication concluded: 
This leads to the final and perhaps the most significant finding, and here the 
evidence is strikingly consistent.  The married testator on the whole shows 
little inclination to avenge himself at death for the slights and frictions of 
marital bliss.  If the balance is struck it is not done so publicly.  For the total 
society this has real meaning: the need for a surviving spouse’s choice 
between the deceased spouse’s testamentary largess and the legislatively-
decreed share is not a need of massive proportions.  The machinery designed 
to satisfy this need need not be massive and insensitive; on the contrary, the 
dimensions of need are such as to compel the conclusion that the machinery 
should be keyed to individuation and able to adjust its impact to the 
circumstances calling it into play.236
One very early study from the mid-eighteenth century shows that, even in 
colonial times, spouses were incredibly unlikely to be disinherited.237  
Husbands with minor children were “particularly likely to bequeath the wife 
more than her minimum dower rights.”238
A related statistic is the percent of assets, on average, that testators leave to 
surviving spouses.  In one study of federal estate tax returns from 1998-2000, 
married male decedents bequeathed a larger percentage of their estate to their 
 
 
233 Id. at 687 (citing Dunham, supra note 231, at 255 n.28 (1963) (acknowledging that the rate 
of will contests “would not appear alarming.”)). 
234 Id. at 712 (citing Dunham, supra note 231, at 255). 
235 SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 312 (“Although testamentary freedom permits the 
disinheritance of immediate or distant kin in favor of nonrelated persons, this rarely occurs.”). 
236 Plager, supra note 35, at 715 (citing Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on 
Testamentary Freedom: A Report on Decedents’ Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. 
L. REV. 277 (1955)). 
237 Brashier, supra note 4, at 141 n.187 (citing Linda E. Speth, More Than Her “Thirds”: 
Wives and Widows in Colonial Virginia, in LINDA E. SPETH & ALISON D. HIRSCH, WOMEN, 
FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA: TWO PERSPECTIVES 5, 15-21 (1983)). 
238 Id. (citation omitted).  
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spouses (62.7 percent) than married female decedents did (54.8 percent).239  
This same study found that widows were, on average, by far the wealthiest 
female decedent group.240
Moreover, with the rise in divorce rates, it is likely that the very rare 
spouse who might have been disinherited decades ago might be divorced 
today.241  With divorce so easy and common today, there are few reasons why 
someone would stay with a spouse they despise until death, when they have 
the ability to disinherit them.  One scholar agrees that “[t]he problem, in fact, 
arises quite rarely in practice.  Studies show little inclination to disinherit 
spouses; and easy divorce makes the problem less real by providing a better 
way to end financial entanglements when the emotional tie has been 
destroyed.”242
2. There Are Many Very Legitimate Reasons for Disinheriting a Spouse 
[T]he existing laws lost their teeth because they were attempting to devour 
everything in sight, including a mass of entirely defensible conveyances.243
With the introduction of the unlimited marital estate tax deduction and the 
so-called Qualified Terminable Interest Trust (“QTIP”) in 1982,244 the reasons 
for disinheriting a spouse are dwindling.245  The reasoning that most give for 
elective share laws is “to protect the dutiful spouse who was loyal to the end, 
only to be left destitute and denied a rightful share of the marital property.”246   
Nevertheless, there are numerous valid reasons for not leaving all of your 
property to your spouse, and as the study cited above confirms, almost all of 
the time the spouse agrees with these reasons.  The most prevalent reason is 
probably estate planning.  There are numerous marital and nonmarital trusts 
that are available to estate planners to assist in planning for someone with even 
modest means.  These include, but are not limited to, setting up marital trusts 
where the surviving spouse has at least a mandatory income interest for his or 
her lifetime, and quite often has an interest in trust corpus as well.  Also very 
 
 
239 Barry W. Johnson & Jacob M. Mikow, Federal Estate Tax Returns, 1998-2000, STAT. 
INCOME BULL. 133, 141 (Spring 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/00esart.pdf. 
240 Id. at 144. 
241 Brashier, supra note 4, at 146. 
242 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in EDWARD C. 
HALBACH, JR., DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 15 (1977). 
243 Cahn, supra note 22, at 153. 
244 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 429 (citing I.R.C. § 2056 (1986)). 
245 Pennell, supra note 13, § 903.1. 
246 Id.  
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common is the use of so-called “bypass trusts” that utilize the statutory federal 
estate tax exemption amount (currently $1.5 million).  Practitioners often draft 
these trusts to allow the surviving spouse access to trust income and/or 
principle.  These simple and prevalent tax-planning techniques usually provide 
for the surviving spouse, often quite amply, despite not being outright marital 
transfers.  Indeed, in the Pennell study, in seventy-five percent of the instances 
of “disinheritance,” the surviving spouse was left with one or more life 
interests in trusts or property.247
There are, of course, many non-tax reasons for setting up trusts, and 
marital trusts are no different.  Trusts were used extensively in this country 
long before the advent of the estate tax in 1913.  As Pennell detailed in his 
study, traditional reasons for using a trust “might include the desire to protect 
the spouse from predators, the need for expert property management, the desire 
to shelter wealth and use the decedent’s unified credit, and denial of control 
over the decedent’s wealth because it was a short term marriage, there were 
children from a prior marriage, a business agreement or prenuptial 
agreement.”248  Pennell found, as shown in more detail below, that “in some 
cases the spouse’s disinheritance is in favor of a trust or other arrangement that 
is designed as a safety net for the surviving spouse and is not designed to 
disinherit at all; there are no mala fides in any of this planning.”249
The Pennell disinheritance study listed several non-tax, legitimate reasons 
for disinheritance found among the 2,500-plus wills: spouses were divorcing 
or had been separated for some time at the time of one spouse’s death;250 the 
primary residence was left outside the will to the surviving spouse or was 
already in the surviving spouse’s name and there was little other property;251 
the surviving spouse was provided for as the beneficiary of non-trust assets 
outside probate-like life insurance, annuities, qualified plans and the like;252 
the surviving spouse was already well provided for253 by having ample assets 
 
 
247 Id.  
248 Id.   
249 Id.   
250 Id.  One male decedent stated that he was leaving his wife nothing because she was living 
with another man, and one female decedent stated that she had not seen her husband in 20 years. 
 Id. 
251 Id.   
252 Id. 
253 Even if everyone agrees that the support theory is the correct one, the definition of support 
may well differ between the decedent spouse and the state legislature.  See Plager, supra note 
35, at 715 (“But when wealth-holders use a will, the stage is set for a potential conflict between 
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in his or her own name and thus the decedent’s assets provided for other 
worthy beneficiaries such as children or other family members;254 the decedent 
and surviving spouse came to an agreement, either formally or informally, 
about how assets would be divided at their respective deaths;255 where the 
surviving spouse was incapable of caring for himself or herself, assets were 
sometimes left to a relative or caregiver with precatory instructions to use the 
assets for the benefit of the surviving spouse;256 often children or 
grandchildren of the decedent and surviving spouse’s marriage were the 
primary beneficiaries;257 and in a “good number” of cases, the surviving 
spouse was named the fiduciary – executor or trustee – of the probate estate or 
trust assets and the fiduciary-spouse did not object to the property distribution 
scheme of the will.258
Finally, in some circumstances, it may make sense to disinherit one’s 
spouse as part of a plan to qualify for government benefits, including 
Medicare.259  This may be very important in instances when the surviving 
spouse would have too much wealth to qualify for Medicare, but not enough 
wealth to cover the very expensive costs of long-term medical care. 
Commentators have argued, for example, that “the intuitive response that 
[disinheritance] just is not frequently done, does not mean the problem does 
 
society’s and the testator’s concern for the surviving spouse.  This is true whether the issue 
arises out of a testator’s desire to punish the spouse, or simply because he applies a different 
standard of need.”) (emphasis added).  
254 Pennell, supra note 13, § 903.1.  One decedent stated: “I have not made any bequest to my 
husband . . . [because he has] been blessed and [is] financially sufficient.”  Id. (alteration in 
original).  Another stated: 
My beloved wife has been my constant companion and source of comfort and 
inspiration.  All my earthly possessions would never repay her love and devotion.  It 
is therefore through no lack of affection that I bequeath the residue of my estate in 
the manner herein provided.  Rather, it is because both she and I believe that her 
needs and comforts have been amply provided for by me outside of this Will and 
through a substantial estate of her own.   
Id.  See also Brashier, supra note 4, at 141-42 (“The disinherited spouse today will often have 
her own income or be provided for through assets passing outside the estate.  In many instances, 
the surviving spouse is the recipient of a pension or federal or state governmental benefits 
derived from the testator that cannot be conveyed to others through his will.”). 
255 Pennell, supra note 13, § 903.1.   
256 Id.   
257 Id.  Pennell states that, in these cases, there was “no indication that [the children] were 
from a prior marriage.”  Id. 
258Id.  As Pennell states, this gives “the unmistakable indication that the disinheritance was 
agreed upon and not a product of animosity or mala fides at all.”  Id. 
259 Id. § 903.3. 
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not exist. . . . [M]ore than two centuries of case law involving interspousal 
disinheritances . . . proves that it does happen.”260  However, the real point is 
as follows: yes, disinheritance does happen, but virtually all disinheritance 
happens for good, legitimate reasons with which the surviving spouse 
agrees.261  Testamentary freedom is valuable.262  As one commentator noted: 
[W]hen spousal disinheritance does occur, the modern testator may have 
legitimate reasons for so doing. . . . Particularly now, when young newlyweds 
are presumed to enter into the marriage as approximate equals, an arbitrary 
forced share scheme may ultimately serve the interests of greed rather than 
obligation and need.263
3. Not a Gender Issue – Men Are Twice as Likely to be Disinherited as 
Women 
The Pennell study referenced above shows that women are much less 
likely to be disinherited than men in the modern era.  Overall, men were 
disinherited at a rate of 25.6 percent versus 14.3 percent.264  This point 
highlights the logical shallowness that proponents of spousal forced heirship 
argue, namely that if men were allowed to by law, they would disinherit their 
wives in favor of undeserving beneficiaries in much greater proportions than 
women would. 
4. Women Very Well May Now Have Roughly Equivalent Net Worths 
[A]lthough women may be disadvantaged in the occupational 
marketplace, they are not disadvantaged in matters of inheritance. . . .265
The dower concept originally protected women, and most would think of 
women as the gender most affected by the elimination of modern-day dower 
and the elective share.  There seem to be few reliable, current statistics on net 
 
 
260 Id. § 905 (citing Sheldon F. Kirtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform 
Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981, 993 (1977)). 
261 Id. 
262 As all competent estate planners know, use of the elective share can dismantle an 
otherwise effective estate plan.  Indeed, the failure of an attorney to inform the client of this 
potential has been held to be grounds for a malpractice action.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 
6, at 433 (citing Johnson v. Sandler, 958 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)). 
263 Brashier, supra note 4, at 141-42. 
264 Pennell, supra note 13, § 903 n.26. 
265 SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 313. 
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worth broken down by gender,266 though studies cited by commentators in the 
middle of the last century maintained that, even then, “women own[ed] the 
great bulk of the country’s wealth.”267  One fifteen-year-old study concurred, 
finding women’s net worth to be higher than men’s net worth on estate tax 
returns.268
As the following qualitative chart indicates, in theory women’s net worth 
(not income, but net worth) today should be roughly equivalent to men’s net 
worth.  
 
 
266 Note that, of course, there are plenty of statistics of income broken down by gender, but 
that is not what is at issue here. 
267 MACDONALD, supra note 164, at 25 n.23 (citing SATURDAY REV. LITERATURE, Mar. 12, 
1949, at 18 (“between sixty and seventy percent”); Women in the Dough, AM. MAG., Mar. 1948, 
at 112 (“nearly 70 percent of the investment funds”); FL. TIMES-UNION, Mar. 4, 1954, at 4 (“80 
percent of the wealth”); A Woman Banker Looks at Women and Their Money, 30 INDEP. 
WOMAN, Apr. 1951, at 99). 
268 Barry W. Johnson, Personal Wealth, 1992-1995: The Distribution and Composition of 
Personal Wealth in the United States, STAT. INCOME BULL. 70, 71-72 (Winter 1997/1998), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/92-95pw.pdf (finding that the average net worth of 
male decedents over age 21 was $1,330,000, compared to $1,370,000 for women decedents over 
age 21).  Note that to file an estate tax return, a decedent must have had a net worth of at least 
$600,000 at the time of this study. 
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Source of Wealth Men v. Women 
Inheritance and gifts from ancestors Equal269
Inheritance from spouse Big edge to women because 
(1) women live longer than men, 
and (2) women tend to marry at a 
younger age than men270
Inter vivos gifts from spouse and others Slight edge to women271
Built from own work efforts during 
lifetime 
Men probably still have an edge 
Divorce proceeds Women probably have an edge 
 
 Anecdotally, the estate planners that I know indicate they are visited 
equally by wealthy women and wealthy men. 
It is not clear, then, that women are in need of the protection that they once 
may have required.272  Indeed, women likely desire testamentary freedom in 
equal numbers to men as seen from the Pennell study, which found that 
women disinherited their surviving spouses twice as often as men did.273
                                                                                                                 
 
269 SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 313 (“Female children are as likely to inherit as male 
children . . . .”). 
270 See id. (“[G]iven the greater longevity of women and the likelihood that they are younger 
than their husbands, female spouses are more likely to inherit than male spouses.”). 
271 A 1997 study of gift tax returns showed that females received a higher percentage of 
reportable gifts (47.7 percent) than males (47.0 percent).  Martha B. Eller, Inter Vivos Wealth 
Transfers, 1997 Gifts, STAT. INCOME BULL. 52, 56 (Winter 2003), available at 
http://66.77.33.7/pub/irs-soi/97transf.pdf.  In addition, males transferred a higher total amount 
of reportable gifts than did females ($17.6 billion versus $14.7 billion).  Id. at 57. 
272 See, e.g., Hall v. McBride, 416 So. 2d 986, 990 (Ala. 1982).  The court stated: 
It is clear that the widow’s right to dissent had its origin in a time when women had 
no property rights.  Women needed some protection of the law to prevent their 
husbands from transferring all assets that would provide women with a means of 
support.  This is no longer the case.  Women may, and do, freely build separate 
estates and freely transfer assets.  In many cases, women may accumulate more 
wealth than their husbands. 
Id.  Note that this was stated twenty-three years ago.  Women, in the meantime, have almost 
surely made even more strides in net worth compared to men. 
273 See supra text accompanying note 264.  
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5. If Unintentional Disinheritance is a Real Issue, Then Existing 
 Pretermitted Spouse Statutes Are the Answer 
Commentators have also listed unintentional disinheritance as a rationale 
for elective share statutes.274  Pretermitted spouse statutes, currently available 
in almost all jurisdictions, form a much better basis for providing for 
unintentionally disinherited spouses.275  Pretermitted statutes do not restrict 
testamentary freedom and therefore should be encouraged.276  These laws 
provide for a surviving spouse in an instance where a testator does not change 
her will after a marriage.277  The state presumes in this situation that the 
testator simply forgot to update her will after the marriage.278   
6. Surviving Spouses Are Adequately Protected by Existing Protections 
and  Incentives 
Even where the testator’s affection for the spouse has waned, fear that his 
disinherited spouse will vilify his memory may provide a sufficient impetus to 
include her in his will.279
There are numerous protections and incentives built into the current 
system that would provide more than enough protection for surviving spouses 
should the elective share laws be repealed.  These include: a one hundred 
 
 
274 See, e.g., Pennell, supra note 13, § 905. 
If the empiricists are correct that a comprehensive protective scheme is unnecessary 
because there is factually little evidence of disinheritance, protective legislation . . . 
should have little restrictive effect or no impact on most plans . . . . Rather, 
legislation like the augmented estate provisions . . . would provide protection against 
unintentional spousal disinheritance or disinheritance resulting from 
vindictiveness . . . . 
Id. (alteration in original) (citing Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept under the 
Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981, 1061-
62 (1977)).  A pretermitted heir includes a “spouse who has been [unintentionally] omitted from 
a will. . . . Most states have . . . pretermitted-heir statutes under which an omitted . . . spouse 
receives the same share of the estate as if the testator had died intestate . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 728 (7th ed. 2001). 
275 See Pennell, supra note 13, § 905.  As the Pennell study indicated, unintentional 
disinheritance is a very small part of an already small percentage of disinheritances, with 98 
percent of disinheritances lacking an “evil motive.”  Id. 
276 SIMES, supra note 2, at 18 (“They merely require the testator expressly to exclude a 
particular class of heirs.”). 
277 ANDERSEN & BLOOM, supra note 23, at 288-90. 
278 Id.  
279 Brashier, supra note 4, at 140; see also Chaffin, supra note 21, at 464 (discussing “the 
influence of public opinion”). 
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percent estate tax deduction for transfers to U.S.-citizen spouses;280 ERISA 
protection for qualified retirement plans (surviving spouses must have 
survivorship rights if the employee-spouse predeceases, and spouses can only 
waive this right in writing and not via a premarital agreement);281 the family 
allowance amount (generally a fixed amount or the amount necessary to 
support the surviving family members for a year);282 Social Security spousal 
survivor benefits;283 placing valuable property in a tenancy by the entirety or, 
at a minimum, a joint tenancy with right of survivorship;284 the homestead 
allowance (to ensure the family home flows to the surviving spouse free of 
encumbrances);285 the exempt personal property set-aside (to ensure certain 
tangible personal property flows to the surviving spouse);286 the availability of 
life insurance;287 the avoidance of will contests;288  the availability of 
antenuptial and post-nuptial agreements;289 and the “normal affection of 
spouses who choose to remain married.”290
                                                                                                                 
 
280 See Brashier, supra note 4, at 140-41; Pennell, supra note 13, § 905; GLENDON, supra note 
14, at 239 (“tax law (which can be decisive for the estate planning of the well-to-do) 
increasingly encourages dispositions in favor of the surviving spouse by giving such 
dispositions preferred treatment”); Chaffin, supra note 21, at 465. 
281 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 420-21; Pennell, supra note 13, § 905. See 
generally Chaffin, supra note 21, at 465-67.  Is it odd that Congress has chosen to step into this 
debate only with respect to qualified plans? 
282 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 422; Chaffin, supra note 21, at 468; see, e.g., 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-404(a) (amended 1993) (allowing a reasonable allowance that cannot 
continue beyond a year if the estate is inadequate to pay creditors). 
283 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 419-20; Chaffin, supra note 21, at 465-67. 
284 See Brashier, supra note 4, at 145-46. 
285 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 421-22. 
286 Id. at 422. 
287 See Brashier, supra note 4, at 145 (“Life insurance is yet another way in which a spouse 
can protect herself from disinheritance.”); see also id. (explaining that husband and wife have 
insurable interests in each other’s lives (citing 3 GEORGE J. COUCH ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 
§ 24:125 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1993))). 
288 See Pennell, supra note 13, § 905; Chaffin, supra note 21, at 464-65. 
289 See Chaffin, supra note 21, at 467-68; Brashier, supra note 4, at 143-45, 147.  Brashier 
notes, in particular, that: 
Even if spousal disinheritance occurred more often, abolition of the forced share 
does not seem unduly harsh in view of the variety of means through which a spouse 
may protect her interest in family assets during the testator’s lifetime.  Today, 
almost all Americans are aware of the availability of the antenuptial agreement, by 
which a prospective spouse can ensure her financial position for the future.  No 
longer novel or used solely by the wealthy, such an agreement is not properly 
viewed as a contract in anticipation of marital failure.  Rather, it is the expression of 
two responsible persons who recognize that marriage is in many respects a business 
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These arguments have been playing out in the test grounds of Georgia, 
where disinheritance has been permitted for some time.  As stated above, 
precious little disinheritance occurs without the surviving spouse’s consent in 
this state where it is perfectly legal.291
If the elective share statutes are eliminated in separate property 
jurisdictions, then perhaps the family allowance should be raised to decrease 
the chances that the surviving spouse will be forced onto public assistance.292
B. There Is Fundamental Inequity with Current Elective Share Schemes: 
 Those Who Can Afford Sophisticated Legal Advisors Can Usually Plan 
 Around the Laws 
Only the poor and the stupid need conform [to the elective share laws].293
Forty-nine of fifty states have laws in place to protect, to one extent or 
another, against spousal disinheritance via either community property or 
elective share laws.294  Neither community property nor separate property 
jurisdictions, however, protect against disinheritance absolutely.  Indeed, many 
 
and that, in marriage as in business, advance planning can avert later disaster.  The 
post-nuptial agreement between willing spouses may serve to accomplish similar 
results. 
. . . .  
Abolition of the elective share could be expected to cause many individuals 
contemplating marriage to engage in meaningful planning for future contingencies.  
Contractual arrangements based on full disclosure and good faith and concurrent 
ownership in its various forms would not only assure protection for a surviving 
spouse (or lover, in the case of unmarried couples), but would also emphasize the 
economic aspects of the partnership.  If the couple so wished, nothing would prevent 
them from agreeing that the survivor should receive one-third (or any other arbitrary 
fractional interest) of the estate. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
290 Pennell, supra note 13, § 905; see also Chaffin, supra note 21, at 464; Brashier, supra note 
4, at 140 (“The testator has a variety of incentives to provide adequately for his spouse.  The 
testator, for example, typically feels a natural affection for his spouse and wants to ensure that 
she is provided for upon his death.”). 
291 Pennell, supra note 13, § 903. 
292 A family allowance consists of “[a] portion of a decedent’s estate, set aside by statute for a 
surviving spouse, children, or parents, regardless of any testamentary disposition or competing 
claims.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 76 (7th ed. 2001).  The UPC, for example, provides that 
the surviving spouse and surviving children “are entitled to a reasonable allowance in money 
out of the estate for their maintenance during the period of administration, which allowance may 
not continue for longer than one year . . . .”  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-404 (amended 1993). 
293 Cahn, supra note 22, at 150. 
294 Pennell, supra note 13, § 904.  Every jurisdiction, that is, except Georgia. 
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jurisdictions do so little in practice to stop disinheritance, they should simply 
recognize the regime for what it is and eliminate their elective share law. 
If the statutes creating such valuable rights for widows . . . are subject to easy 
evasion by transfers inter vivos, their utility is slight indeed. . . . In view of 
the jurisprudence in some states, the question may well be put whether these 
statutes have been placed on our books for any sincere enforcement.  Or do 
they simply represent a sort of sentimental desire of the community which 
must be formally registered but need not inconvenience those with means to 
consult competent counsel?  Are these laws a mere pious wish, a sort of 
sanctimonious recital of what we should prefer but will not insist upon?295
As seen below, in any jurisdiction, if one pays a high enough billable-hour 
rate to a good-enough estate planning attorney, and is willing to accept at least 
some amount of hassle, then the elective share laws can be planned around, 
and a spouse disinherited (likely for very legitimate reasons).  For those 
individuals, however, who are unable to engage in this type of planning for 
financial reasons, it is most certainly not a level playing field.296  These 
individuals have no choice but to accept the spousal forced heirship regimes, 
even if the individual has a very good reason for wanting to disinherit his or 
her spouse.297
 
 
295 Cahn, supra note 22, at 150. 
296 See, e.g., Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 987 
(1999) (arguing that “only the wealthy have expansive testamentary freedom because their 
resources are extensive enough to fulfill societal expectations of support to biological family 
members and simultaneously include bequests to others” (citing SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 6)).  See also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, 
Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 377: 
Freedom of testation, then, is most truly a working reality for the upper classes, but 
even for them it is hedged about with restrictions.  The lower down the economic 
scale one goes, the higher the likelihood that assets will largely be bound assets 
outside the system of testation or subject to levy by the nuclear family. 
Id. 
297 Testators with large estates have the testamentary freedom to choose how and to whom the 
estate shall be distributed.  SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.  Note, however, that the testator 
of a small estate, i.e., under the statutory mandatory allowance amount, has essentially no 
testamentary freedom – his or her will is basically of no use vis-à-vis its dispositive provisions.  
See id. (“Limited assets induce forced succession even though the testator might have had other 
things in mind.”).  The assets in a small estate will most likely “be consumed entirely in 
payment of debts or by the exemption, year’s allowance, and other provisions . . . .” Id.  
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Since there is no way to tighten the laws enough to keep high net worth 
individuals from exploiting the system, the current system should be 
eliminated because of its fundamental unfairness.  As one commentator noted:  
A more reasonable surmise about the porous nature of these statutes is that 
legislatures are not totally committed to the concept of an elective share: to 
the extent they retain escape hatches the legislature may be indicating that 
those who want to engage in this planning badly enough to hire competent 
counsel ought to have the opportunity.  Thus, freedom of testation remains 
available to those decedents with enough wealth to be well-advised.  This last 
response may suggest that these laws ought to be repealed and, if appropriate 
in the first instance, replaced with rules that are effective to protect the 
policies underlying these statutes.  As it is, any approach that is 
circumventable – and every elective share statute is more easily avoided than 
community property – merely creates unjustified expectations and reliance by 
the nonpropertied spouse.298  
1. Planning Around Separate Property Elective Share Laws 
[T]he beauty of the forced share is only skin deep; protection is 
announced, but it is not given.299
 a. Simple Probate Avoidance Techniques that Retain Grantor  
  Control
A substantial minority of states still allow a grantor to establish a simple 
revocable inter vivos trust that will avoid being subject to the elective share at 
 
 
298 Pennell, supra note 13, § 905.  Pennell goes on to say: 
So, for example, if it is correct to say that “[t]he presumed intent of husbands and 
wives [is] to pool their fortunes . . . an unspoken or imputed marital bargain . . . that 
each is to enjoy a half interest in the economic production of the marriage . . . 
nominally acquired by and titled in the sole name of either partner,” then the ability 
to circumvent these statutes indicates that reliance on this implied understanding is 
unjustified, a chimera if one spouse chooses to breach the bargain.  Also quaere 
whether the presumption is correct: if the spouses remain married but one spouse 
“reneges” on the “bargain,” isn’t this proof positive that the presumption itself is 
flawed and that these statutes should not be premised on it?  Either way you look at 
the issue, it seems fair to argue that these laws are inappropriate from their inception 
because they are based on flawed assumptions, or they defeat expectations because 
they are so easy to avoid. 
Id. (citing Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 
21, 43 (1994)). 
299 MACDONALD, supra note 164, at 3. 
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death.300  Revocable trusts are very common, and are as easy to prepare as a 
will.  Once executed, a grantor must only retitle his or her property into the 
name of the revocable trust, and that property so retitled is no longer subject to 
probate at the grantor’s death.  There are many legitimate reasons for wanting 
to avoid probate (such as eliminating potentially costly and lengthy court 
proceedings at death, privacy, and immediate access to assets by beneficiaries 
at death, among others) such that this cannot be labeled a “disinheritance 
technique.” 
As trustee of the revocable trust, a grantor can retain virtually the same 
control that he or she would have if the property were held outright.  This 
leads to a form-over-substance argument that, in theory, elective share laws 
should treat assets held in revocable trusts the same as assets held outright by a 
decedent.  
Anyone who for legitimate (or illegitimate) reasons wants to disinherit 
their spouse can do so very easily in one of the jurisdictions that follows the 
traditional elective share-type laws.  This leads to a dichotomy between those 
that engage in some modest amount of estate planning and those that simply 
have wills prepared.  In these jurisdictions, it is so easy to avoid being subject 
to the elective share laws that legislatures should either repeal the elective 
share law (a preferable alternative) or at the very least toughen it to the level of 
the Uniform Probate Code’s elective share provision.  Anywhere in between 
should be avoided as bad (and failed) public policy. 
  b. Other Elective Share Avoidance Techniques 
There are a wide variety of elective share laws, between the substantial 
minority of jurisdictions that allow assets placed in revocable trusts to avoid 
being subject to claim by a surviving spouse,301 to those jurisdictions that have 
incorporated the Uniform Probate Code’s very tough elective share 
provisions.302  While difficult to summarize, there are several techniques that 
someone who engages in some level of planning could utilize to avoid being 
subject to elective share laws.   
One is outright gifts.  The simplest measure that can be taken, and one that 
works in any jurisdiction, is to simply give away – with no strings attached – 
 
 
300 See Pennell, supra note 13, § 904.1; BOWE ET AL., supra note 81, § 3.20, at 148-55.  
301 See discussion supra Part VI.B.1.a. 
302 See discussion infra Part VI.B.1.b; Pennell, supra note 13, § 904.3; BOWE ET AL., supra 
note 81, § 3.20; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 445 (Connecticut and Ohio are two 
states in which nonprobate transfers are not subject to the elective share). 
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property to someone other than your spouse.  In most jurisdictions, this works 
immediately (even on your death bed), and in Uniform Probate Code states, 
this works as long as the grantor lives two years after the gift.303  A second 
technique includes most non-probate transfers.  Many states allow some or all 
non-probate transfers to be outside the elective share system.  This would 
include life insurance,304 qualified retirement plans, joint tenancies, joint 
accounts, most irrevocable trusts, etc.305  A third technique is pre- or 
postnuptial agreements.  If the spouses agree to opt out of the elective share 
system in a separate property state, they can do so by contractual agreement.306 
 A fourth option is to change domicile.  One could move away from a strict 
jurisdiction to one that has more loopholes; or to Georgia, which has 
eliminated the elective share altogether.  The situs of the property itself could 
also be moved to a more favorable jurisdiction.  There are, of course, choice of 
law considerations in play with these tactics, and careful planning should occur 
before any such move.307  Fifth, many states have favorable laws that allow 
individuals with incompetent spouses to structure, at a minimum, any marital 
devises such that the decedent retains control over the ultimate disposition of 
that property after the death of the incompetent spouse.308  Older versions of 
the Uniform Probate Code, in fact, allow an elective share only if “‘necessary 
to provide adequate support’” for the actuarial life expectancy of the 
incompetent surviving spouse.309  Sixth, spouses may purchase treasury 
obligations.  New York law exempts U.S. savings bonds and Treasury bills 
from its elective share regime based on perceived Constitutional conflicts.310  
Even if one is not a New York resident, it may be possible to take advantage of 
this aspect of New York law by locating these assets in New York.311  Last, for 
 
 
303 See Pennell, supra note 13, § 904.3B; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(3)(iii) (amended 
1993). 
304 Neither the states nor the federal government interfere with one’s right to designate 
whomever they wish to receive life insurance proceeds.  Why have we chosen this path with 
insurance, but not, for example, with ERISA retirement plans?  In theory, one could easily 
invest quite a large portion of their assets into life insurance policies designated to go to one or 
more non-spousal beneficiaries. 
305 See Pennell, supra note 13, § 904.3F n.91 (citing ACTEC, supra note 182). 
306 Pennell, supra note 13, § 904.3A. 
307 Id. §§ 904.3C-3D. 
308 Id. § 904.3N (citation omitted). 
309 Id. (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203 (amended 1993)).  See also DUKEMINIER ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 423. 
310 Pennell, supra note 13, § 904.3E (citing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-
1.1(b)(2)(C) (McKinney 1997)). 
311 Id. § 904.3E. 
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short-term marriages, spouses may utilize the Uniform Probate Code.  As 
discussed above (see discussion supra Part VI.B.1.b.), the Uniform Probate 
Code provisions set up a sliding scale, starting at 0 percent for shorter-term 
marriages.312  Thus, establishing domicile in a Uniform Probate Code state 
would effectively disinherit a spouse in a short-term marriage. 
  c. Planning Around the Uniform Probate Code Elective Share  
  Provision 
The relatively new elective share provisions of the Uniform Probate Code 
are the toughest in the country to get around.  There are a few ways to plan 
around even these laws, though.  First, one could set up an irrevocable life 
insurance trust and have the trustee purchase a life insurance policy, or one 
could even transfer an existing policy to a new trust with a two-year waiting 
period.313  Second, gifts more than two years before death also escape the 
Uniform Probate Code provisions.314  Third, one could provide all the 
consideration for a joint purchase of property with a non-spouse, with the 
result that only fifty percent of the value will be subject to the elective share.315 
 Finally, annual exclusion gifts (currently $11,000/person/year) are 
exempted.316
2. Establishing an Offshore Trust 
Foreign jurisdictions don’t recognize a spouse’s right to an elective share 
against the estate.  Therefore, assets that are transferred to an offshore 
jurisdiction will not be subject to the claims of a surviving spouse.317
Commentators seem not to be discussing what may be the surest way 
around the elective share laws, and the only way around the stricter elective 
share laws, while still allowing the grantor to remain a discretionary 
beneficiary – offshore asset protection trusts.318  If prepared and implemented 
properly, these trusts – set up in the modern era in the Cook Islands and similar 
jurisdictions – allow a great deal of flexibility while keeping the trust assets 
 
 
312 See id. § 904.3M (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 1993)). 
313 Id. § 904.3G (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(2)(i)). 
314 Id. (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(3)). 
315 Id. (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(1)(ii)). 
316 Id. (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(3)). 
317 Brinker & Langdon, supra note 18. 
318 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 557-60 (discussing self-settled asset protection 
trusts).  Note that I am not discussing fraudulent conveyances, but rather legal offshore 
transfers.  “Fraud is so old a villain that courts should find little difficulty in recognizing his 
face.”  Cahn, supra note 22, at 153. 
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beyond the reach of American courts.  Therefore, no matter what the state 
elective share legislation states, if the money is offshore, then it is not coming 
back.   
This type of planning is becoming much more commonplace and easier in 
practice to implement than a couple of decades ago.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that recently people are much more worried about asset protection 
generally, and are increasingly setting up offshore trusts for asset protection 
reasons, not necessarily to get around the elective share laws.  No matter the 
motivation, however, make no mistake that these trusts are very much acting to 
dodge the elective share laws.  Offshore asset protection planning is the 
ultimate in the debate between “haves and have-nots,” with this “nuclear 
option” not available to ordinary citizens who cannot afford the relatively large 
fees associated with this type of planning. 
C. Elective Share Laws Are Paternalistic, Perpetuating the Mythical Image of 
Women as the “Weaker Sex” in Need of Protection, and Furthering Harmful 
Gender Stereotypes by Relegating Women to an Inferior Position 
[D]ependence [is] the gravamen of inheritance.319
Like Father, apparently most state legislatures know “what is best” – 
women are weak and need governmental protection from disinheritance.  This 
way of thinking is as wrong today as it was one hundred, or even one thousand 
years ago.  “Spouses are capable, responsible individuals and should be treated 
as such.  Intervention by the state into their relationship is seldom necessary 
and should be discouraged.”320
Early common law property systems were characterized by two major 
principles – the wife’s legal identity merged into that of the husband’s, and the 
total domination of the wife.321  Some of the justifications put forth included: 
(1) in exchange for the protection and support of her husband, the wife 
bargained away her property and personal rights; and (2) “there could only be 
one head of household and . . . the husband, because of his superior physical 
strength and business aptitude, was the natural choice.”322   
 
 
319 Id. at 145. 
320 Brashier, supra note 4, at 147. 
321 See Scott Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and 
Common-Law Marital Property Systems and their Relative Compatibility with the Current View 
of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71, 73-74 (1979-
1980). 
322 Id. at 77 n.24. 
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Early on, the feminist movement323 sought to fix the family model of 
support, not replace it.324  The nineteenth-century women’s rights movement 
“fought for dower reform, recognizing . . . the ideological role of dower in 
shaping the female-dependent/male-provider model of the family, as well as 
women’s second-class citizenship rights.”325  As one scholar noted recently: 
By perpetuating the wifely synthesis of protection and dependency, dower 
preserved a woman’s socioeconomic and cultural status as a wife even 
beyond her husband’s death.  Much as a coverture326 required a husband to 
support his wife and demanded a wife’s reciprocal dependence, dower 
granted to a widow a seemingly powerful protective right to financial 
resources from her deceased husband, and simultaneously virtually ensured 
that those resources would not render her financially independent.  Dower 
thus “aimed at the sustenance, rather than the economic freedom, of widows.” 
 As such, it reproduced the basic gendered tenets of the law of marriage and 
extended them beyond marriage.327
Initially, feminists sought formal equality, where men and women were 
entitled to the same legal status and rights.328  Dower was denounced on 
 
 
323 Feminist legal theory is a reaction to the gender inequality perpetuated by a patriarchal 
culture.  Anne-Marie L. Storey, An Analysis of the Doctrines and Goals of Feminist Legal 
Theory and Their Constitutional Implications, 19 VT. L. REV. 137, 140 (1994). “Patriarchy is a 
‘system of social relations in which men as a group have power over women as a group; it is a 
system that is characterized by relationships of domination and submission, superiority and 
inferiority, power and powerlessness, based on sex.’”  Id. (quoting Diane Polan, Toward a 
Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE  294, 302 n.1 
(David Kairys ed., 1982)).   
324 Dubler, supra note 30, at 1700-01.  Dubler theorizes: 
The very parameters of their respective projects point to the generally bounded 
imagination with which both feminist and legal actors approached the questions 
posed by dower’s clear failure.  Perhaps this is not surprising.  Most women’s rights 
activists, after all, sought not utopian solutions, but rather practical ways to better 
women’s lived experiences within an existing set of social relations.   
Id. at 1701 (citations omitted). 
325 Id. at 1651. 
326 Coverture is defined as follows: “The inclusion of a woman in the legal person of her 
husband upon marriage under common law.  Because of coverture, married women formerly did 
not have the legal capacity to hold their own property or contract on their own behalf.  These 
disabilities have been removed for the most part by statute.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 
OF LAW 103 (1996).  
327 Dubler, supra note 30, at 1667-68 (quoting Alexander Keyssar, Widowhood in Eighteenth-
Century Massachusetts, 8 PERSP. AM. HIST. 83, 103 (1974)).  
328 Id. at 1677-78. 
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equality grounds because it sought to create separate legal worlds for men and 
women with sex-specific privileges and responsibilities.329  The movement 
later split between “equality” and “difference” feminists, the latter arguing that 
women needed different forms of protection in order to achieve equal status.330
Regarding gender stereotypes, noted philosopher John Stuart Mill said: 
The general opinion of men is supposed to be, that the natural vocation of a 
woman is that of a wife and mother.  I say . . . one might infer that their 
opinion was of the direct contrary. . . . [I]f they are free to do anything 
else . . . there will not be enough of them who will be willing to accept the 
condition said to be natural to them. . . . I should like to hear someone openly 
enunciating the doctrine . . . . It is necessary to society that women should 
marry and produce children.  They will not do so unless they are compelled.  
Therefore it is necessary to compel them.331
Like the attack on dower in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
there are strong arguments that dower’s replacement – the elective share – is 
similarly “unduly patronizing.”332  “Even in gender-neutral form, [it] 
perpetuates . . . the . . . impression of the meek and needy wife and discourages 
equality among spouses during the marriage.”333
After all, politicians still look to marriage, broadly defined, as a solution to 
female dependency, pointing to the family as the proper providing institution 
 
 
329 Id. at 1679. 
330 Id. at 1690.  The “equality principle,” in essence, maintains that “sex stereotypes must be 
supplanted by sex equality as the guiding principle for social regulation.”  John D. Johnston, Jr., 
Sex and Property, the Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum, and Developments 
Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1972).  “Fairness in result, rather than the 
appearance of equality on the face of legal rules, must be the goal.”  Id. at 1035-36.  The issue 
can be characterized as follows: is equality achieved by refusing to recognize any difference 
between men and women as being legally relevant (equal rights approach) or by recognizing the 
differences that exist and reflecting them in the law (difference approach)?  See Storey, supra 
note 323, at 147.  The “neutrality principle” states that individuals should be “left completely 
free to make their own arrangements.”  Johnston, supra, at 1036.  “It questions the validity of 
any form of socially compelled conformity regarding individual relationships . . . .”  Id. at 1036. 
This line of reasoning criticizes the “effort of society to compel individual conformity to sex-
based behavioral norms” through laws or regulations, which ties into the testamentary freedom 
arguments made herein.  Id. 
331 Johnston, supra note 330, at 1034 n.4 (citing John S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ON 
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 221-23 (E. Neff ed., 1926)). 
332 Brashier, supra note 4, at 151. 
333 Id.  
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for women’s material needs, and, thus, designating husbands as the proper 
providers for female citizens. . . . [A]s long as marriage plays this mediating 
role in the collective imagination of lawmakers, it remains incompatible with 
a robust notion of sex equality and female citizenship.334
What is a modern family?  When enacting elective share laws, legislatures 
clearly had in mind the nuclear family where the wife did not work outside the 
home and was not educated enough to handle her own affairs.335  This view of 
women meant that a woman needed to be protected because she was weak – a 
view that is just plain demeaning and wrong in today’s society (if it was ever 
right to begin with).  Legislators need a serious attitude adjustment regarding 
their view of women in the modern family.     
State legislatures have been reacting to last century’s problem at each 
step.336  When women were kept from the workplace before the 1930s, states 
only had the quite inadequate dower to protect women, many of whom really 
did need the better elective share form of protection.  When women started to 
work beginning in the 1930s, ironically, is when states began to enact elective 
share laws.337  Incredibly, as late as 1992, states were still changing from 
dower to elective share laws when they should have been eliminating dower 
and elective share laws completely, because women no longer needed “the 
man” to shelter her.  
When, as today, two presumably competent individuals enter into a marriage 
as equals in the eyes of the law, the elective share – especially the fixed 
fraction elective share – is unduly patronizing.  The marriage contract is an 
agreement between two individuals, each of whom is fully capable of 
providing for and protecting himself or herself prior to and after the nuptial 
vows.  Even in its gender-neutral form, the forced share perpetuates to no 
small degree the lingering impression of the meek and needy wife and 
discourages equality among the spouses during the marriage.  If legislatures 
want to provide truly gender-neutral treatment for spouses, then they must 
replace the forced share with community property principles or, alternatively, 
abolish the forced share and let the spouses protect themselves.338
 
 
334 Dubler, supra note 30, at 1715. 
335 Brashier, supra note 4, at 148-49. 
336 Id. 
337 Id. at 149. 
338 Id. at 151. 
792 BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44 
 
                                                                                                                
Ridding society of the elective share laws would have the beneficial side 
effect of encouraging wives to become engaged in the family’s financial affairs 
and planning, and “to demand deserved recognition of their contributions as 
wives, mothers, and wage earners.”339  The female spouse that does not work 
outside of the home will rest more comfortably knowing she is not dependent 
upon her husband who might be controlling every aspect of the family unit’s 
financial and non-financial spoils.340  An elective share law “tacitly encourages 
irresponsibility and dependence.”341
As one commentator summarized: 
[T]he argument for abolition assumes that spouses are capable, responsible 
individuals and should be treated as such.  Intervention by the state in their 
relationship is seldom necessary and should be discouraged.  The current 
arbitrary, paternalistic elective share statutes may trammel testamentary 
freedom by imposing a mandatory inheritance in favor of competent 
surviving spouses who can protect themselves.342
There is a definite tension between notions of subordination and 
protection. “[W]hen confronted repeatedly with the specter of widows in dire 
financial straits, lawmakers have refashioned marriage’s shadow, hoping to 
return widows to their proper places as dependents within families with 
responsible (albeit dead) male providers.”343
“Many of the legal restrictions defining the status of married women were 
couched in the language, not of restriction, but rather of marital protection.”344 
 Rather than encouraging widows to be strong, move on with their lives, and 
be happy and productive, elective share laws reinforce the notion that widows 
are no more than the wives of their dead husbands.345
As one commentator noted: 
The forced share statute may impede the progress of sex equality by 
deceptively leading one to believe it is in the widow’s best interest.  Although 
today’s statutes are gender-neutral, they are still permeated with the historical 
 
 
339 Id. at 147. 
340 Id.  
341 Id. at 148 n.211. 
342 Id. at 147. 
343 Dubler, supra note 30, at 1649. 
344 Id. at 1655. 
345 Id. at 1658. 
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taint of paternalism, which in turn is linked to subordination of women.  (If 
one is servile and docile, one can hope to be protected by the beneficent and 
powerful.)  If legislatures really believe that the marriage is an institution 
where two spouses participate in an economic partnership, it is ironic that in 
41 of the 50 states title alone determines ownership of property until divorce 
or death.346
Another asked: “how much weight should be given to the fact that laws 
emphasizing and responding to the factual economic dependence of married 
women may tend to perpetuate dependence and to discourage the acquisition 
of skills and seniority needed to make married women economically 
independent and equal in the labor market?”347  Indeed, “opting for devices 
which shore up the economic role of housewife will, in the long run, work to 
the economic detriment of women.”348
[W]hen the widespread expectation that marriage will last only so long as it 
performs its function of providing personal fulfillment is put together with the 
reality of unilateral divorce, a diminished sense of economic responsibility 
after divorce, the increasing economic independence of married women, and 
the expansion of social welfare, the resulting state of affairs does not lead 
inevitably to the sharing of worldly goods.  Compulsory sharing . . . may 
come to be seen by increasing numbers of spouses as undesirable . . . .349
VII. CONCLUSION 
Thus while it is generally true that in this century greater inheritance 
protection has been afforded to the surviving spouse (to the detriment of 
other family members), Pollock and Maitland’s 1895 protest remains valid: 
not every change from the law of savagery to the present has been 
favorable to the wife.350
 
 
346 Brashier, supra note 4, at 150 n.222 (arguing that the “‘fragmented compilation of marital 
property laws represents a ‘non-system’ and an abdication of responsibility by the legislatures 
of common law states’” (quoting Richard W. Bartke, Marital Sharing – Why Not Do It By 
Contract?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1131, 1133 (1979))). 
347 GLENDON, supra note 14, at 326.  
348 Id. (citing Stöcker, Zur Kritik des Familenvermögensrechts, 13 Neue Juristiche 
Wochenschrift 553 (1972)).  
349 Id. at 327. 
350 Brashier, supra note 4, at 151 n.224 (citing 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. 
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 400-01 (2d ed. 1923)). 
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If, as a policymaker, one believes the marital partnership theory of 
marriage to be gospel, then by goodness change to community property and be 
done with it.  Do not, as many states have done, choose separate property (an 
inherently non-partnership, eat-what-you-kill philosophy) and then try to graft 
some back-end sorry excuse for community property at death.  As LBJ351 
would say, “That dog won’t hunt.” 
But if you truly believe, as I think many well-intentioned people do, that 
this America and its citizens have a long tradition of property and testator 
freedom, then keep your separate property system and completely eliminate 
your elective share law.  Those are really the only two options that have 
internally consistent logic. 
If you eliminate the elective share laws, the sky will not fall.  They have 
been doing it for decades in Georgia and all the empirical evidence shows that 
things are working just fine, thank you.  Georgians are free to exercise a 
fundamental freedom – to give their property to whomever they wish with no 
governmental interference.  We should all be so lucky. 
The fact that the privileged can pay their way out of any elective share law 
– by some estate planning technique or by moving money offshore – and the 
less financially fortunate cannot, is a real injustice that must be rectified.  
Elective share laws have been around since the 1930s in this country, and even 
with seventy-plus years of tinkering, these laws are still too easy for a good 
enough attorney to bypass.  Let us eliminate the elective share laws for all, not 
just the well-to-do. 
Today, women are in a financial position to desire testamentary freedom 
just as much as men do.  (Recall that the Pennell study showed that men were 
twice as likely to be disinherited as women were.352)  The elective share laws 
are terribly demeaning and paternalistic to women.  Male-dominated 
legislatures, though, continue to perpetuate belittling female stereotypes by 
saying through elective share laws that women are so incompetent and unable 
to stand up for themselves that the “little missies” still must be protected by 
some ancient magical sword. 
With literally every single disinheritance study showing de minimis rates 
of disinheritances that are not agreed to by the spouse, elective share laws 
 
 
351  Lyndon B. Johnson, Master of the Senate, Texan extraordinaire, and U.S. President. 
352 See supra text accompanying note 264. 
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seem like some ridiculous school child’s Rube Goldberg machine353 trying to 
solve in as complex a manner as humanly possible a problem that really does 
not exist.  Every few years, mostly male law professors huddle to build a better 
mousetrap to keep their evil male counterparts from doing something they 
have no desire or motivation to do,354 and in the process precious freedom – 
for both men and women – loses out.   
Let us stop this costly arms race and simplify by either implementing 
community property or eliminating elective share laws: the only two logical 
outcomes.  Anything else is no-man’s land. 
 
 
 
353 Rube Goldberg machines are “devices that are exceedingly complex and perform very 
simple tasks in a very indirect and convoluted way.”  WIKIPEDIA, Rube Goldberg, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rube_Goldberg (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).   
354 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-207 (amended 1993). 
